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  I.	   INTRODUCTION	  Between	   1980	   and	   2010,	   at	   least	   147,912	   Irish	   women	  traveled	   outside	   their	   own	   country	   to	   gain	   access	   to	   safe	   and	  legal	   abortions.1	   These	   women	  were	   required	   to	   travel	   abroad	  due	   to	   Ireland’s	   prohibition	   on	   abortion	   in	   all	   circumstances	  
 
	   1.	   Abortion	  Statistics,	  IR.	  FAMILY	  PLANNING	  ASS’N,	  http://www.ifpa	  .ie/eng/Hot-­‐Topics/Abortion/Statistics	   (last	   visited	   Sept.	   2,	   2011)	   (noting	  that	   this	   is	  an	  underestimation	  because	  some	  women	  do	  not	  give	   their	   Irish	  addresses	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  confidentiality).	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  except	  where	  there	  is	  a	  real	  and	  substantial	  risk	  to	  a	  woman’s	  life	  that	  can	  only	  be	  avoided	  by	  terminating	  the	  pregnancy.2	  Irish	  law	  effectively	  forces	  all	  women	  seeking	  abortions	  who	  cannot	  meet	  this	   high	   burden	   to	   travel	   outside	   of	   Ireland	   to	   obtain	   an	  abortion,	  regardless	  of	  the	  circumstances.3	  	  When	  A,	  B	  &	  C	  v.	   Ireland4	   came	  before	   the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	   Rights	   (“the	   Court”),	   the	   Court	  was	   presented	  with	   the	  question	  of	  whether	  Ireland’s	  abortion	  laws	  violate	  the	  European	  Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   (“the	   Convention”)	   and	   had	   the	  opportunity	  to	  declare	  that	  Article	  8	  of	  the	  Convention,	  the	  right	  to	   privacy,	   guarantees	  women	   a	   fundamental	   right	   to	   abortion.	  When	  the	  Court	  failed	  to	  do	  so	  in	  its	  December	  16,	  2010	  decision,	  reactions	   to	   the	   ruling	   were	   mixed.5	   While	   abortion	   activists	  criticized	  the	  Court’s	  ruling	  regarding	  A	  and	  B,	  many	  applauded	  the	  Court	  for	  expanding	  the	  right	  to	  abortion	  through	  its	  ruling	  in	  
 
	   2.	   See	  Att’y	  Gen.	  v.	  X,	  [1992]	  1	  I.R.	  1,	  53-­‐54	  (Ir.)	  (holding	  that	  permitting	  termination	  of	  pregnancies	  in	  such	  situations,	  including	  the	  risk	  of	  suicide,	  is	  consistent	   with	   the	   proper	   interpretation	   of	   the	   Irish	   Constitution).	  But	   see	  INT’L	  PLANNED	  PARENTHOOD	  FED’N	  EUR.	  NETWORK,	  ABORTION	  LEGISLATION	  IN	  EUROPE	  39-­‐40	   (2009),	   available	   at	   http://www.ippfen.org/NR/rdonlyres/	  DB347D31-­‐0159-­‐4C7D-­‐BE5C428623ABCA25/0/Pub_Abortionlegislationin	  EuropeIPPFEN_Feb2009.pdf	   (finding	   that	   no	   known	   abortions	   have	   been	  carried	  out	  within	  the	  country	  under	  any	  circumstances).	  
	   3.	   See	  CTR.	  FOR	  REPRODUCTIVE	  RIGHTS,	  THE	  WORLD’S	  ABORTION	  LAWS	  2	  (2009),	  http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net	  /files/documents/pub_fac_abortionlaws2009_WEB.pdf	   [hereinafter	   CTR.	   FOR	  REPRODUCTIVE	   RIGHTS]	   (highlighting	   that	   Ireland	   does	   not	   allow	   abortions	   in	  cases	   of	   rape,	   incest,	   fetal	   impairment,	   or	   when	   a	   woman’s	   health	   or	  socioeconomic	  well-­‐being	  are	  at	  risk).	  	   4.	   A	   v.	   Ireland	   (A,	   B,	   &	   C	   v.	   Ireland),	   App.	   No.	   25579/05,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	  (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item	  =4&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en.	  
	   5.	   Compare	  Ruth	  Fletcher,	  The	  Trouble	  with	  A,	  B	  &	  C:	  Guest	  Post	  from	  Ruth	  
Fletcher,	   HUMAN	   RIGHTS	   IN	   IR.	   (Dec.	   24,	   2010),	  http://www.humanrights.ie.index.php/2010/12/24/the-­‐trouble-­‐with-­‐a-­‐b-­‐c-­‐guest-­‐post-­‐from-­‐ruth-­‐fletcher	  (expressing	  concern	  over	   the	  weight	   the	  Court	  gave	  to	  public	  morals,	  the	  lack	  of	  consideration	  it	  gave	  to	  women’s	  health,	  and	  its	   marginalization	   of	   European	   consensus	   on	   women’s	   right	   to	   abortion),	  
with	  Stephanie	  Samuel,	  Abortion	  ‘Right’	  Denied	  in	  European	  ‘Roe	  v.	  Wade’	  Case,	  CHRISTIAN	   POST	   (Dec.	   16,	   2010,	   11:55	   AM),	   http://www.christianpost.com/	  news/abortion-­‐right-­‐denied-­‐in-­‐european-­‐roe-­‐v-­‐wade-­‐case-­‐48094	   (reporting	  the	  Alliance	  Defense	  Fund’s	  favorable	  reaction	  to	  the	  Court’s	  affirmation	  of	  a	  State’s	  right	  to	  protect	  fetal	  life).	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  applicant	   C’s	   case.6	   Because	   C’s	   life	   was	   at	   risk,	   the	   Court	   held	  that	   Ireland	   violated	   the	   Convention	   by	   failing	   to	   provide	   a	  regulatory	   framework	   through	   which	   C	   could	   establish	   her	  qualification	  for	  a	  lawful	  abortion	  in	  Ireland.7	  While	  this	  aspect	  of	  the	  Court’s	  holding	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  step	  forward	  for	  abortion	  rights	  in	   Ireland,	   the	   Court	   declined	   to	   hold	   that	   the	   Convention	  provides	   a	   fundamental	   right	   to	   abortion	   and	   instead	   declared	  that	   Ireland	   did	   not	   violate	   applicants	   A	   and	   B’s	   rights	   even	  though	  their	  health	  and	  well-­‐being	  —	  rights	  protected	  as	  part	  of	  the	   fundamental	   right	   to	   privacy	  —	  were	   at	   risk.8	   Because	   the	  
 
	   6.	   See,	  e.g.,	  European	  Court	  Says	  Abortion	   Is	  a	  Rights	   Issue,	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  WATCH	  (Dec.	  16,	  2010),	  http://www.hrw.org/en/news/	  2010/12/16/ireland-­‐european-­‐court-­‐says-­‐abortion-­‐rights-­‐issue	   (calling	   the	  Court’s	  ruling	  a	  “wake-­‐up	  call”	  to	  Ireland	  for	  violating	  human	  rights	  by	  failing	  to	  ensure	  women’s	  access	  to	  abortion	  when	  a	  woman’s	  life	  is	  at	  risk,	  in	  which	  case	   an	   abortion	   is	   legal	   under	   Irish	   law);	   see	   also	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   App.	   No.	  25579/05,	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  75	  (2010),	  http://cmiskp.	  echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en	   (finding	   that	   the	   Irish	  authorities	   violated	   Article	   8	   of	   the	   Convention	   by	   failing	   to	   provide	   “an	  accessible	   and	   effective	   procedure”	   for	   determining	   whether	   the	   plaintiff	  qualified	  for	  a	  lawful	  abortion).	  
	   7.	   See	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   App.	   No.	   25579/05,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   74-­‐75	   (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4&portal	  =hbkm&action=html&highlight=Ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en	   (criticizing	   Ireland	   for	   failing	   to	   implement	   a	   “legislative	   or	   regulatory	  regime”	  enabling	  women	  to	  exercise	  their	  right	  to	  an	  abortion	  when	  their	  life	  is	   at	   risk).	   	  Notably,	  when	  analyzing	  C’s	   case,	   the	  Court	   considered	  Tysiąc	  v.	  Poland,	  a	  2007	  ruling	  holding	  that	  Poland	  failed	  in	  its	  obligation	  to	  implement	  a	   procedural	   framework	   that	   ensures	   women	   access	   to	   abortion	   where	  lawfully	  permitted	  in	  Poland,	  including	  where	  a	  woman’s	  health	  is	  severely	  at	  risk.	   See	   Tysiąc	   v.	   Poland,	   App.	   No.	   5410/03,	   45	   Eur.	   H.R.	   Rep.	   955,	   979-­‐82	  (2007)	   (assessing	   the	   right	   of	   a	   Polish	   woman	   diagnosed	   with	   myopia,	   a	  serious	  eye	  condition	  that	  can	   lead	  to	  blindness,	   to	  obtain	  an	  abortion	  when	  her	   pregnancy	   and	   pending	   birth	   were	   likely	   to	   cause	   the	   myopia	   to	  substantially	  worsen).	  The	  Court	  in	  A,	  B	  &	  C	  found	  that	  C,	  who	  had	  cancer,	  had	  a	  justifiable	  fear	  that	  her	  life	  was	  at	  risk	  because	  of	  the	  pregnancy’s	  effect	  on	  her	  cancer	   treatment	  and	  her	   inability	   to	  either	  determine	   the	  actual	   risk	   to	  her	  life	  or	  procure	  an	  abortion	  in	  Ireland,	  due	  in	  part	  to	  doctors’	  reluctance	  to	  assist	   her	   for	   fear	   of	   prosecution	   because	   of	   a	   lack	   of	   legal	   framework	  establishing	   the	   circumstances	   in	   which	   abortions	   are	   permitted	   within	  Ireland.	   	   .	   See	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   App.	   No.	   25579/05,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   70,	   71-­‐72,	   73	  (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197	  /view.asp?item=4&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en.	  
	   8.	   See	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   App.	   No.	   25579/05,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   61,	   68	   (2010),	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   ruled	   that	   Ireland	   violated	   C’s	   right	   to	   privacy,9	   this	  Comment	  will	  not	   focus	  on	   the	  Court’s	  holding	  regarding	  C	  and	  will	  only	  analyze	   the	  Court’s	   failure	   to	  uphold	  applicants	  A	  and	  B’s	  right	  to	  health	  and	  well-­‐being	  as	  part	  of	  their	  right	  to	  privacy.	  	  Article	   8	   of	   the	   Convention	   guarantees	   the	   right	   to	   privacy,10	  which	  the	  Court	  has	  held	  to	  encompass,	  among	  other	  rights,	  the	  right	   to	   health	   and	  well-­‐being.11	   The	   Court’s	   ruling	   in	  A,	   B	   &	   C	  examined	   a	   woman’s	   right	   to	   an	   abortion	   in	   cases	   where	   an	  abortion	   is	   necessary	   to	   protect	   a	   woman’s	   health	   and	   well-­‐being,	  as	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  A	  and	  B.	  The	  Court	  assessed	  this	  right	  in	  light	   of	   Ireland’s	   aim	   of	   protecting	   “public	   morals,”	   which,	  Ireland	  asserts,	  includes	  the	  protection	  of	  fetal	  life.12	  In	  A,	  B	  &	  C,	  the	  Court	  ruled	  that	  Ireland’s	  abortion	  laws	  satisfy	  women’s	  right	  to	   health	   and	   well-­‐being.	   The	   Court	   found	   that	   Ireland	  successfully	   balanced	   competing	   State	   and	   individual	   interests	  by	   granting	   women	   the	   right	   to	   travel	   out	   of	   the	   country	   to	  obtain	   an	   abortion.	   Therefore,	   the	   Court	   upheld	   Ireland’s	  abortion	  laws	  despite	  the	  laws’	  failure	  to	  recognize	  an	  exception	  when	  a	  woman’s	  health	  is	  at	  risk.13	  
 http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197	  /view.asp?item=4&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en(concluding	   that	   the	   prohibition	   in	   Ireland	   on	  abortions	   sought	   for	   reasons	   of	   health	   and	   well-­‐being	   does	   not	   exceed	   the	  State’s	  margin	  of	  appreciation).	  
	   9.	   Id.	  at	  68.	  	   10.	   	  See	  Convention	   for	   the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Fundamental	  Freedoms	   art.	   8(1),	   Nov.	   4,	   1950,	   213	   U.N.T.S.	   221	   [hereinafter	   European	  Convention]	  (“Everyone	  has	  the	  right	  to	  respect	  for	  his	  private	  and	  family	  life,	  his	  home	  and	  his	  correspondence.”).	  
	   11.	   See	   Tysiąc,	   45	   Eur.	   H.R.	   Rep.	   at	   976-­‐77	   (referring	   to	   an	   individual’s	  “physical	   and	   psychological	   integrity”	   as	   encompassed	   within	   the	   right	   to	  respect	  for	  one’s	  private	  life).	  
	   12.	   See	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   App.	   No.	   25579/05,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   62,	   63	   (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4&	  portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en	  (indicating	  that	  a	  1983	  referendum	  leading	  to	  the	  enactment	  of	  Article	  40.3.3	   of	   the	   Constitution	   evidenced	   that	   the	  majority	   of	   Irish	   citizens	  were	  against	  abortion	  and	  suggesting	  that	  Irish	  societal	  views	  on	  the	  issue	  have	  not	  changed	   since	   then);	   see	  also	   Referendum	  Act	   1983	   (Act	  No.	   14/1983)	   (Ir.),	  
available	  at	  http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1983/en/act/pub/	  0014/print.html.	  
	   13.	   See	  discussion	  infra	  Part	  II.C	  (explaining	  that	  the	  Court	  granted	  Ireland	  broad	  discretion	  to	  regulate	  a	  woman’s	  access	  to	  abortion	  because	  the	  Court	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   Comment	   argues	   that	   the	   Court	   in	   A,	   B	   &	   C	   incorrectly	  assessed	  the	  right	  to	  health	  and	  well-­‐being	  under	  Article	  8	  of	  the	  Convention	  by	  misapplying	  the	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  test	  used	  to	  determine	  whether	  a	  State’s	  restriction	  on	  a	  fundamental	  right	  violates	   the	   Convention.	   In	   doing	   so,	   the	   Court	   improperly	  deferred	   to	   Ireland’s	   domestic	   legislation	   by	   granting	   Ireland	   a	  broad	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   —	   the	   ability	   to	   regulate	   a	  fundamental	  right	  guaranteed	  under	  the	  Convention.	  Specifically,	  this	   Comment	   argues	   that	   the	   Court	   incorrectly	   assessed	  Ireland’s	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   to	   restrict	   the	   right	   to	   health	  and	   well-­‐being	   by	   disregarding	   the	   sweeping	   nature	   of	   Irish	  abortion	   law	   and	   its	   effect	   on	   women’s	   health	   and	   well-­‐being,	  and	  by	   incorrectly	  examining	  European	  consensus	  on	   the	   issue.	  By	   finding	   that	   Ireland’s	   restrictive	   abortion	   laws	   successfully	  balance	   Ireland’s	   aim	   of	   protecting	   public	  morals	   and	  women’s	  right	   to	   health	   and	   well-­‐being,	   the	   Court	   in	   A,	   B,	   &	   CB,	   &	   C	  significantly	   limited	   women’s	   right	   to	   privacy	   under	   the	  Convention.	  	  Part	  II.A	  of	  this	  Comment	  explains	  the	  meaning	  and	  treatment	  of	   the	   right	   to	   privacy	   under	  Article	   8.14	   Part	   II.B	   discusses	   the	  Court’s	   previous	   case	   law	   relating	   to	   abortion	   rights.15	   Part	   II.C	  details	  the	  Court’s	  ruling	  in	  A,	  B,	  &	  CB,	  &	  C.16	  Part	  III.A	  argues	  that	  the	   Court	   erred	   in	   granting	   Ireland	   a	   broad	   margin	   of	  appreciation	   by	   failing	   to	   account	   for	   the	   Court’s	   past	   case	   law	  when	  determining	  whether	  Irish	  abortion	  laws	  are	  “necessary	  to	  a	   democratic	   society.”17	   Part	   III.B	   argues	   that	   the	   Court	  incorrectly	   examined	   consensus	   among	   European	   States	   when	  determining	   A	   and	   B’s	   rights.18	   Part	   IV.A	   recommends	   that	   the	  Court	   adopt	   a	   more	   consistent	   application	   of	   the	   margin	   of	  appreciation.19	   Part	   IV.B	   suggests	   that	   the	   Court	   either	   find	   a	  fundamental	   right	   to	   abortion	   when	  women’s	   health	   and	   well-­‐being	   are	   at	   risk,	   or	   develop	   a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   analysis	   that	  
 largely	  defers	  to	  the	  State	  when	  regulations	  are	  based	  on	  public	  morals).	  
	   14.	   See	  discussion	  infra	  Part	  II.A.	  
	   15.	   See	  discussion	  infra	  Part	  II.B.	  
	   16.	   See	  discussion	  infra	  Part	  II.C.	  
	   17.	   See	  discussion	  infra	  Part	  III.A.	  
	   18.	   See	  discussion	  infra	  Part	  III.B.	  
	   19.	   See	  discussion	  infra	  Part	  IV.A.	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   397	  evaluates	  the	  specific	  health	  risks	  for	  each	  woman.20	  Finally,	  Part	  IV.C	   recommends	   that	   other	   States	   and	   international	   bodies	  exert	  pressure	  on	  Ireland	  to	  change	  its	  restrictive	  laws.21	  II.	   BACKGROUND	  When	   interpreting	  Article	  8	  of	   the	  Convention,	   the	  Court	  has	  noted	  repeatedly	  that	  the	  right	  to	  privacy	  is	  a	  broad	  right	  that	  is	  an	  extremely	  important	  facet	  of	  individual	  existence.22	  However,	  this	  right	  is	  not	  absolute,	  and	  States	  may	  regulate	  or	  restrict	  the	  right	   to	   privacy	   in	   specific	   circumstances,	   such	   as	   in	   order	   to	  maintain	  a	  State’s	  conception	  of	  public	  morals.	  When	  allowing	  a	  State	   to	   regulate	   an	   individual	   right,	   the	  Court	  determines	  how	  much	  deference	   to	   grant	   to	   the	   State.	  This	   level	   of	   deference	   is	  known	   as	   the	   margin	   of	   appreciation.23	   The	   margin	   of	  appreciation	   the	   Court	   grants	   depends	   upon	   various	   factors,	  primarily	   the	   individual	   interest	   at	   stake,	   the	   State’s	   basis	   for	  restricting	   the	   right,	   and	  whether	   a	   European	   consensus	   exists	  on	   the	   subject.24	   Based	   upon	   Ireland’s	   aim	   of	   protecting	   public	  morals,	   the	  Court	   in	  A,	  B	  &	  C	   granted	   Ireland	   a	  wide	  margin	  of	  appreciation	   to	   restrict	   a	   woman’s	   right	   to	   abortion	   when	   her	  health	   and	   well-­‐being	   are	   at	   risk.25	   The	   Court	   thereby	   avoided	  holding	   Ireland	   in	   violation	   of	   Article	   8	   and	   upheld	   Ireland’s	  current	  abortion	  laws	  that	  compel	  women	  whose	  lives	  are	  not	  at	  risk	  to	  leave	  the	  country	  to	  procure	  an	  abortion.	  	  A.	   THE	  RIGHT	  TO	  PRIVACY	  UNDER	  ARTICLE	  8	  OF	  THE	  CONVENTION	  The	   European	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   established	   the	  European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights	   as	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe’s	  judicial	   body.26	   The	   Court	   was	   designed	   to	   protect	   the	  
 
	   20.	   See	  discussion	  infra	  Part	  IV.B.	  
	   21.	   See	  discussion	  infra	  Part	  IV.C.	  
	   22.	   See	  infra	  notes	  36-­‐42	  and	  accompanying	  text.	  
	   23.	   See	   HOWARD	   C.	   YOUROW,	   THE	   MARGIN	   OF	   APPRECIATION	   DOCTRINE	   IN	   THE	  DYNAMICS	   OF	   EUROPEAN	   HUMAN	   RIGHTS	   JURISPRUDENCE	   13	   (1996)	   (defining	   the	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  as	  “the	  line	  at	  which	  international	  supervision	  should	  give	  way	  to	  a	  State	  Party’s	  discretion	  in	  enacting	  or	  enforcing	  its	  laws”).	  
	   24.	   See	  infra	  notes	  56-­‐65	  and	  accompanying	  text.	  
	   25.	   See	  infra	  notes	  118-­‐21	  and	  accompanying	  text.	  
	   26.	   See	  MICHAEL	  D.	  GOLDHABER,	  A	  PEOPLE’S	  HISTORY	  OF	  THE	  EUROPEAN	  COURT	  OF	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	   4	   (2007)	   (explaining	   that	   the	   Court	   did	   not	   begin	   sitting	   as	   a	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  fundamental	   human	   rights	   that	   are	   guaranteed	   under	   the	  Convention,	  to	  examine	  States’	  compliance	  with	  these	  rights,	  and	  to	  interpret	  what	  is	  encompassed	  within	  each	  of	  the	  enumerated	  fundamental	   rights.27	   If	   an	   individual	   believes	   a	   Council	   of	  Europe	   State	   violated	   her	   fundamental	   rights	   under	   the	  Convention,	  she	  may	  bring	  a	  case	  before	  the	  Court	  only	  if	  she	  has	  first	  exhausted	  domestic	  remedies	  or	  the	  Court	  has	  decided	  that	  she	   would	   have	   no	   prospect	   of	   success	   in	   the	   domestic	   court	  system.28	  All	  forty-­‐seven	  contracting	  Council	  of	  Europe	  States	  are	  subject	   to	   the	  Court’s	   jurisdiction	  and	  are	  bound	  by	   the	  Court’s	  rulings.29	   Importantly,	   although	   the	   Convention	   does	   not	  explicitly	  require	  the	  Court	  to	  follow	  its	  past	  cases,	  the	  Court	  has	  demonstrated	   through	   consistent	   and	   extensive	   citations	   to	  previous	  holdings	  that	  its	  cases	  do	  create	  precedent.30	  
 full-­‐time	  Court	  until	  1998,	  and	  that	  prior	  to	  this,	  the	  European	  Commission	  on	  Human	   Rights	   also	   heard	   cases	   and	   could	   then	   refer	   cases	   to	   the	   Court	   for	  final	  judgment).	  
	   27.	   See	   id.	   at	   1	   (characterizing	   the	   Court	   as	   the	   “Supreme	   Court	   of	  Europe”).	  
	   28.	   See	   European	   Convention,	   supra	   note	   10,	   art.	   26	   (“The	   Commission	  may	   only	   deal	   with	   [a	   petition]	   after	   all	   domestic	   remedies	   have	   been	  exhausted	  .	   .	   .	   .”);	  A	  v.	  Ireland,	  App.	  No.	  25579/05,	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  42-­‐45	  (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.	  coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en	   (finding	   that	   A	   and	   B	   were	   not	  required	   to	   exhaust	   all	   domestic	   remedies	   prior	   to	   obtaining	   access	   to	   the	  Court	   because	   Ireland’s	   substantial	   protection	   of	   the	   unborn	   made	   the	  domestic	   remedies	   available	   in	   Ireland	   ineffective,	   leaving	   A	   and	   B	  with	   no	  prospect	  of	  success).	  
	   29.	   See	  European	  Convention,	  supra	  note	  10,	  arts.	  1,	  45,	  53	  (requiring	  that	  all	  contracting	  States	  guarantee	  the	  rights	  enumerated	  in	  the	  Convention	  and	  agree	  to	  be	  bound	  by	  the	  Court’s	  decisions,	  noting	  that	  the	  Court’s	  jurisdiction	  covers	   all	   cases	   interpreting	   and	   applying	   the	   Convention);	   see	   also	   J.G.	  MERRILLS	  &	  A.H.	  ROBERTSON,	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  IN	  EUROPE:	  A	  STUDY	  OF	  THE	  EUROPEAN	  CONVENTION	   ON	   HUMAN	   RIGHTS	   23-­‐24	   (4th	   ed.	   2001)	   (explaining	   that	   in	  complying	  with	  their	  obligation	  under	  Article	  1	  to	  ensure	  their	  domestic	  laws	  conform	  with	   the	  Convention,	   some	  States	  give	   the	   treaty	  direct	  effect	  while	  others	  implement	  it	  through	  domestic	  legislation).	  
	   30.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Goodwin	   v.	   United	   Kingdom,	   2002-­‐VI	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   1,	   26	  (explaining	   that	   the	   Court	   follows	   its	   precedent	   “in	   the	   interests	   of	   legal	  certainty,	   foreseeability	  and	  equality	  before	   the	   law”	  and	  should	  only	  depart	  from	   its	   prior	   judgments	   with	   good	   cause);	   see	   also	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   App.	   No.	  25579/05,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4&	  portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hu
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1.	   Defining	  and	  Determining	  the	  Right	  to	  Privacy	  Under	  the	  
Convention	  Article	   8	   of	   the	   Convention,	   which	   establishes	   the	   right	   to	  privacy,31	   is	   one	   of	   the	   “Personal	   Freedoms	   Articles”	   in	   the	  Convention	   that	   guarantee	   fundamental	   and	   personal	   liberties	  such	   as	   privacy,	   freedom	   of	   speech,	   religion,	   and	   family	   life.32	  Unlike	   the	   United	   States,	   where	   the	   right	   to	   privacy	   is	   not	  explicitly	   granted	  but	   is	  nonetheless	   a	   fundamental	   right	  under	  the	  U.S.	   Constitution,33	   Article	   8(1)	   of	   the	   Convention	   expressly	  protects	   an	   individual’s	   right	   to	   privacy,	   stating,	   “Everyone	   has	  the	  right	  to	  respect	  for	  his	  private	  and	  family	  life,	  his	  home	  and	  his	   correspondence.”34	   In	   the	   same	  way	   the	  U.S.	   Supreme	  Court	  has	   interpreted	   the	   Due	   Process	   Clause	   of	   the	   Fourteenth	  Amendment	   to	   encompass	   privacy,	  which	   in	   turn	   encompasses	  many	   fundamental	   rights,35	   the	   Court	   has	   interpreted	   Article	  8(1)’s	   guarantee	   of	   an	   individual’s	   right	   to	   privacy	   to	   include	  many	  aspects	  of	  one’s	  private	  life.	  The	  Court	  defines	  privacy	  as	  a	  broad	   right	   encompassing,	   among	   other	   privacy	   interests,	  personal	   autonomy,36	   physical	   and	   psychological	   integrity,37	  
 doc-­‐en	  (routinely	  citing	  the	  Court’s	  prior	  decisions).	  
	   31.	   See	  European	  Convention,	  supra	  note	  10.	  
	   32.	   See	   Aaron	   A.	   Ostrovsky,	   What’s	   So	   Funny	   About	   Peace,	   Love,	   and	  
Understanding?	   How	   the	   Margin	   of	   Appreciation	   Doctrine	   Preserves	   Core	  
Human	  Rights	  Within	   Cultural	  Diversity	   and	   Legitimises	   International	  Human	  
Rights	  Tribunals,	  1	  HANSE	  L.R.	  47,	  50	  (2005)	  (explaining	  that	  Articles	  8-­‐11	  all	  contain	  “limitation	  clauses”	  that	  allow	  States	  some	  degree	  of	  derogation	  from	  the	  enumerated	  right	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  a	  public	  interest).	  
	   33.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Roe	   v.	  Wade,	   410	  U.S.	   113,	   152-­‐53	   (1973)	   (holding	   that	   the	  right	  to	  privacy	  exists	  within	  the	  notion	  of	  personal	  liberty	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  Fourteenth	  Amendment	  and	  that	  this	  right	  encompasses	  a	  woman’s	  freedom	  to	  decide	  whether	  to	  terminate	  her	  pregnancy);	  Griswold	  v.	  Connecticut,	  381	  U.S.	  479,	  484	   (1965)	   (declaring	   that	   the	   right	   to	  privacy	   is	   found	  within	   the	  “penumbras”	   of	   the	   guarantees	   established	   in	   the	   Bill	   of	   Rights,	   specifically	  within	  the	  First,	  Third,	  Fourth,	  Fifth,	  and	  Ninth	  Amendments).	  	   34.	   European	  Convention,	  supra	  note	  10,	  art.	  8(1).	  
	   35.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Roe,	   410	   U.S.	   at	   153	   (woman’s	   right	   to	   terminate	   her	  pregnancy);	   Loving	   v.	   Virginia,	   388	   U.S.	   1,	   12	   (1967)	   (individuals’	   right	   to	  marry,	  including	  an	  individual	  of	  a	  different	  race).	  
	   36.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Pretty	   v.	   United	   Kingdom,	   2002-­‐III	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   155,	   193	  (noting	   that	   although	   the	   Court	   has	   not	   explicitly	   established	   this	   right	   in	  Article	  8,	  it	  is	  an	  important	  underlying	  concept	  of	  right	  to	  privacy).	  
	   37.	   See,	  e.g.,	  Tysiąc	  v.	  Poland,	  App.	  No.	  5410/03,	  45	  Eur.	  H.R.	  Rep.	  955,	  977	  (2007)	   (finding	   that	   Poland’s	   abortion	   regulations	  must	   be	   assessed	   against	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  aspects	   of	   an	   individual’s	   physical	   and	   social	   identity,38	   the	  establishment	   and	   development	   of	   relationships,39	   gender	  identification,40	   sexual	   orientation	   and	   sexual	   life,41	   and	   the	  decision	  to	  have	  or	  not	  have	  a	  child.42	  Despite	   the	   broad	   range	   of	   privacy	   rights	   protected	   under	  Article	  8(1),	  these	  rights	  are	  not	  absolutely	  guaranteed.43	  Article	  8(2)	  allows	  States	  to	  regulate	  these	  rights	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  by	  acting	  as	  a	  “limitation	  clause.”	  Article	  8(2)	  states:	  There	  shall	  be	  no	  interference	  by	  a	  public	  authority	  with	  the	  exercise	  of	  this	  right	  [to	  privacy]	  except	  such	  as	  is	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  law	  and	   is	   necessary	   in	   a	   democratic	   society	  .	  .	  .	   for	   the	   protection	   of	  health	  or	  morals,	  or	   for	   the	  protection	  of	   the	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  of	  
 the	   State’s	   obligation	   to	   respect	   a	   woman’s	   physical	   and	   psychological	  integrity).	  
	   38.	   See,	  e.g.,	  Mikulić	  v.	  Croatia,	  2002-­‐I	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  27,	  ¶¶	  53-­‐55	   (holding	  that	  a	  child’s	  right	  to	  determine	  the	  identity	  of	  her	  father	  falls	  under	  Article	  8	  because	   respect	   for	   privacy	   includes	   allowing	   people	   to	   establish	   their	  identity).	  
	   39.	   See,	  e.g.,	   Burghartz	   v.	   Switzerland,	   280	  Eur.	   Ct.	  H.R.	   (ser.	  A)	   at	   22,	   28	  (1994)	  (maintaining	  that	  choice	  of	  one’s	  surname	  implicates	  Article	  8	  because	  the	   use	   of	   a	   name	   is	   a	   means	   of	   linking	   to	   family,	   identifying	   oneself,	   and	  developing	  professional	  relationships).	  
	   40.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Goodwin	   v.	   United	   Kingdom,	   2002-­‐VI	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   1,	   27	  (declaring	   that	   transsexuals’	   right	   to	   legal	   status	   as	   their	   post-­‐operative	  gender	   falls	  within	  Article	  8	  because	   gender	   is	   an	   important	   aspect	   of	   one’s	  personal	  identity	  and	  because	  there	  are	  many	  detrimental	  effects	  to	  having	  to	  maintain	  legal	  status	  as	  a	  different	  gender).	  
	   41.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Dudgeon	   v.	   United	   Kingdom,	   45	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   (ser.	   A)	   at	   18	  (1981)	   (articulating	   that	   the	   very	   existence	   of	   laws	   prohibiting	   homosexual	  activity	   directly	   affect	   the	   right	   to	   respect	   for	   one’s	   private	   life).	   But	   see	  Laskey,	   Jaggard	   and	   Brown	   v.	  United	   Kingdom,	   ¶	   36,	   1997-­‐I	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   4	  (1997)	  (finding	  that	  sexual	  activity	  undoubtedly	  concerns	  an	  intimate	  aspect	  of	  privacy,	  but	  that	  a	  State	  may	  regulate	  sado-­‐masochistic	  activity	  resulting	  in	  physical	  violence	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  public	  health).	  
	   42.	   See,	  e.g.,	  Dickson	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  App.	  No.	  44362/04,	  44	  Eur.	  H.R.	  Rep.	   419,	   428	   (2007)	   (holding	   that	   a	   prisoner’s	   access	   to	   artificial	  insemination	   facilities	   requires	   an	   Article	   8	   analysis	   because	   the	   right	   to	  decide	   whether	   to	   become	   a	   parent	   is	   encompassed	   by	   Article	   8’s	   right	   to	  privacy).	  
	   43.	   See	   European	   Convention,	   supra	   note	   10,	   art.	   8(2);	   see	   also	   Evans	   v.	  United	   Kingdom,	   App.	   No.	   6339/05,	   43	   Eur.	   H.R.	   Rep.	   409,	   429-­‐30	   (2006)	  (describing	  the	  balancing	  test	  the	  Court	  must	  use	  to	  determine	  when,	  and	  to	  what	   extent,	   it	   is	   acceptable	   for	   a	   State	   to	   infringe	   on	   its	   citizens’	   privacy	  rights	  under	  Article	  8).	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others.44	  	  Articles	   9-­‐11,	   the	   other	   Personal	   Freedoms	   Articles,	   include	  analogous	   limitation	   clauses	   and	   allow	   States	   to	   balance	   the	  enumerated	  fundamental	  right	  against	  specified	  State	  interests.45	  	  Article	   8(2),	   along	   with	   the	   analogous	   limitation	   clauses	   in	  Articles	   9-­‐11,	   requires	   the	   Court	   to	   perform	   a	   three-­‐prong	  analysis	  to	  determine	  whether	  a	  State	  has	  properly	  regulated	  the	  fundamental	   right.	   The	   Court	   must	   ask:	   (1)	   whether	   the	  regulation	  is	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  State’s	  law;	  (2)	  whether	  the	  regulation	   pursues	   a	   legitimate	   aim;	   and	   (3)	   whether	   the	  regulation	   is	   necessary	   to	   a	   democratic	   society.46	   To	   determine	  whether	   the	   aim	   is	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   law,	   the	   Court	  requires	   that	   a	   specific	   law	   be	   in	   place,	   that	   individuals	   have	  adequate	   access	   to	   the	   State’s	   law,	   and	   that	   individuals	   can	  foresee	  when	  the	   law	  will	  be	  applied.47	  To	  be	  a	  “legitimate	  aim”	  under	   the	   second	   inquiry,	   the	   State’s	   aim	   in	   enacting	   the	  restriction	   must	   simply	   be	   one	   listed	   in	   Article	   8(2)	   or	   the	  comparable	  clauses	  in	  Articles	  9-­‐11.48	  	  When	  conducting	  this	  three-­‐prong	  inquiry,	  the	  Court	  generally	  
 	   44.	   European	  Convention,	  supra	  note	  10,	  art.	  8(2).	  
	   45.	   See	  Ostrovsky,	  supra	  note	  32,	  at	  50	  (explaining	  that	  the	  first	  clauses	  of	  Articles	  8-­‐11	  grant	  a	  fundamental	  right,	  and	  the	  second	  clauses	  allow	  States	  to	  limit	  this	  right	  in	  certain	  circumstances).	  
	   46.	   See,	   e.g.,	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   App.	   No.	   25579/05,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   62-­‐68	   (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4	  &portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en	   	   (applying	   this	   analysis	   to	  determine	  whether	   Ireland’s	   restriction	  on	  abortion	   is	  a	  violation	  of	  Article	  8);	  Sunday	  Times	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  30	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  A)	  at	  28-­‐42	  (1979)	  (utilizing	  this	  analysis	  in	  the	  context	  of	  an	  Article	  10	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  expression	  case).	  
	   47.	   See,	  e.g.,	  Sunday	  Times,	  30	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  A)	  at	  30-­‐31	  (emphasizing	  that	   the	   Court	   examines	   both	   the	   common	   law	   and	   State	   legislation	   when	  making	  its	  determination).	  
	   48.	   See,	   e.g.,	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   App.	   No.	   25579/05,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   62	   (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4&	  portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en	   (noting	   that	   in	   an	   Article	   8	   inquiry,	   the	   three-­‐part	   test	   examines	  whether	   the	   State’s	   interference	   is	   critical	   to	   the	   pursuit	   of	   one	   of	   the	  “‘legitimate	  aims’	  specified	  in	  Article	  8	  of	  the	  Convention”);	  Sunday	  Times,	  30	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  A)	  at	  29,	  35	  (remarking	  that	  an	  Article	  10	  inquiry	  will	  look	  to	  whether	  the	  State’s	  aim	  is	  “legitimate	  under	  Article	  10(2)”).	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  finds	   that	   a	   State	   has	   met	   the	   first	   two	   requirements	   without	  engaging	   in	  detailed	  analysis,	  and	  primarily	   focuses	  on	  whether	  the	  State	  has	  satisfied	  the	  third	  requirement,	  that	  the	  regulation	  be	   “necessary	   to	   a	   democratic	   society,”	   or	   the	   “necessity	  analysis.”49	   For	   a	   regulation	   that	   limits	   a	   fundamental	   right	   to	  constitute	  a	  “necessity”	  such	  that	  a	  State	  may	  infringe	  upon	  that	  right,	  the	  State’s	  regulation	  must	  be	  proportionate	  to	  the	  aim	  it	  is	  pursuing	   and	   must	   correspond	   to	   a	   “pressing	   social	   need.”50	  When	  determining	  whether	  the	  law	  is	  proportional	  (whether	  the	  State	  properly	  balanced	  the	  relevant	  competing	  interests	  in	  each	  particular	  case),51	   the	  Court	  must	   first	  determine	  the	  amount	  of	  deference	  it	  will	  grant	  to	  the	  State	  in	  making	  this	  proportionality	  determination.	  This	  amount	  of	  deference	  is	  known	  as	  the	  margin	  of	  appreciation.52	  The	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  analysis	   is	   similar	  to	  the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court’s	  determination	  of	  the	  proper	  level	  of	  scrutiny	  to	  apply	  when	  deciding	  if	  a	  state	  law	  is	  unconstitutional.	  Just	  as	  the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court	  grants	  more	  or	   less	  deference	  to	  states	  based	  upon	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  right	  and	  the	  breadth	  of	  the	  law,	   the	   European	   Court	   considers	   similar	   factors	   when	  determining	   an	   appropriate	   margin	   of	   appreciation.53	   The	  European	  Court’s	  narrow	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court’s	  strict	  scrutiny	  standard,54	  while	  a	  wide	  
 
	   49.	   See	   GEORGE	   LETSAS,	   A	   THEORY	   OF	   INTERPRETATION	   OF	   THE	   EUROPEAN	  CONVENTION	  OF	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  86	  (2007)	  (highlighting	  the	  “necessity”	  analysis	  as	   the	   “most	   important	   and	   most	   demanding	   criterion	   for	   whether	   the	  limitation	  of	  a	  right	  was	  permissible	  under	  the	  Convention”).	  
	   50.	   See	   Handyside	   v.	   United	   Kingdom,	   24	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   (ser.	   A)	   at	   22-­‐23	  (1976)	   (explaining	   that	   the	   term	   “necessary,”	   although	   not	   meaning	  “indispensible,”	  is	  not	  a	  flexible	  term	  and	  is	  more	  stringent	  than	  terms	  such	  as	  “useful”	  or	  “reasonable”).	  
	   51.	   See	   Ostrovsky,	   supra	   note	   32,	   at	   48-­‐49	   (observing	   that	   the	   Court’s	  analysis	   is	   premised	   on	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   State	   is	   primarily	   responsible	   for	  judging	  local	  conditions	  and	  balancing	  State	  and	  individual	  interests).	  
	   52.	   See	   id.	  at	  48	  (remarking	  that	   the	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  doctrine	  aids	  the	  Court	  in	  determining	  when	  it	  would	  be	  appropriate	  intervene	  in	  a	  State’s	  regulation	  of	  its	  own	  citizens).	  
	   53.	   See	   id.	   at	   60-­‐61	   (suggesting	   that	   both	   mechanisms	   balance	   the	  importance	  of	  protecting	  core	  rights	  against	  the	  need	  for	  regulatory	  flexibility	  within	  a	  diverse	  political	  environment).	  
	   54.	   See	  16B	  C.J.S.	  Constitutional	  Law	  §	  1116	  (2011)	  (noting	  that	  to	  survive	  a	  strict	  scrutiny	  analysis,	  which	  is	  used	  when	  the	  individual	  interest	  involved	  is	  fundamentally	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  Constitution,	  the	  state	  must	  show	  it	  has	  a	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  margin	  of	  appreciation	  is	  comparable	  to	  the	  rational	  basis	  test.55	  The	   Court	   determines	   the	   breadth	   of	   a	   State’s	   margin	   of	  appreciation	   to	   determine	   whether	   or	   how	   to	   regulate	   a	  fundamental	   right	   in	   part	   by	   balancing	   the	   aim	   of	   the	   State	  against	   the	   individual	   right	  at	   stake.56	  When	  a	  State	   is	  pursuing	  the	   aim	   of	   regulating	   public	   morals	   under	   Article	   8(2)	   or	   the	  analogous	   clauses	   of	   Articles	   9-­‐11,	   the	   Court	   grants	   the	   State	  considerable	   deference	   in	   how	   to	   regulate	   the	   fundamental	  right.57	   The	   Court	   reasons	   that	   because	   there	   is	   no	   uniform	  conception	   of	   morals	   among	   Council	   of	   Europe	   States,	   local	  governments	   are	   in	   the	   best	   position	   to	   determine	   the	  “necessity”	   of	   a	   restriction	   enacted	   to	   protect	   such	   morals.58	  Therefore,	   the	   Court	   will	   grant	   States	   a	   wide	   margin	   of	  appreciation	   to	   restrict	   a	   fundamental	   right	   when	   such	   a	  restriction	   is	   enacted	   to	   protect	  what	   the	   State	   considers	   to	   be	  public	  morals.	  	  Importantly,	   however,	   the	   Court	   does	   not	   grant	   States	  unlimited	   discretion	   to	   limit	   rights	   by	   invoking	   the	   State’s	  protection	   of	   public	   morals.59	   The	   normally	   broad	   margin	   of	  appreciation	  may	   be	   limited	   by	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   specific	   right	  involved	  or	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  restriction	  on	  the	  individual	  
 compelling	   interest	   in	   interfering	   with	   the	   exercise	   of	   that	   right	   and	   the	  interference	  is	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  that	  interest).	  
	   55.	   See	   id.	  §	  1120	  (stating	  that	  the	  rational	  basis	  standard	  is	  used	  when	  a	  state	   interference	   involves	   rights	   or	   interests	   that	   are	   not	   fundamentally	  guaranteed	  by	   the	  Constitution	  and	  merely	  requires	   that	   the	   interference	  be	  used	  to	  reasonably	  achieve	  a	  legitimate	  state	  interest).	  
	   56.	   See	  Yuval	  Shany,	  Toward	  a	  General	  Margin	  of	  Appreciation	  Doctrine	   in	  
International	  Law?,	  16	  EUR.	   J.	   INT’L	  L.	  907,	  927	  (2005)	  (stating	  that	   the	  Court	  also	  considers	  the	  ability	  of	  local	  authorities	  to	  better	  assess	  subjective	  norms	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  European	  consensus	  on	  a	  given	  standard).	  
	   57.	   See,	   e.g.,	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   App.	   No.	   25579/05,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   65	   (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4&	  portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en	   (granting	   Ireland	   a	   broad	  margin	   of	   appreciation	   in	   its	   regulation	   of	  abortion).	  
	   58.	   See	  Handyside	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  24	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.A)	  at	  22	  (1976)	  (recognizing	  the	  constant	  evolution	  of	  opinions	  concerning	  moral	  issues).	  
	   59.	   See	  id.	  at	  23	  (limiting	  States’	  discretion	  to	  regulate	  by	  declaring	  that	  the	  Court,	  in	  its	  supervisory	  function,	  makes	  the	  final	  determination	  as	  to	  whether	  a	  regulation	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  Convention).	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  applicant.60	  For	  example,	  in	  Open	  Door	  and	  Dublin	  Well	  Woman	  v.	  
Ireland,	   the	   Court	   found	   that	   Ireland’s	   regulations	   on	  disseminating	   information	   about	   abortion	   services	   outside	  Ireland,	   enacted	   to	   protect	   Ireland’s	   public	  moral	   of	   protecting	  fetal	   life,	   deserved	   particularly	   careful	   scrutiny	   because	   the	  information	   being	   restricted	  may	   be	   crucial	   to	  women’s	   health	  and	  well-­‐being.61	  The	  Court	  granted	  the	  State	  a	  narrow	  margin	  of	  appreciation	   because	   of	   the	   injunction’s	   potential	   to	   harm	  women	  by	  delaying	  their	  abortions,	  causing	  them	  to	  obtain	  false	  information,	  or	  preventing	  them	  from	  receiving	  any	  information	  when	  accurate	  information	  may	  be	  crucial	  to	  their	  health.62	  Finally,	   in	   addition	   to	   considering	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   State’s	  regulation	   and	   the	   individual	   interest	   at	   stake,	   the	   margin	   of	  appreciation	   granted	   to	   States	   is	   influenced	   by	   European	  consensus	  as	   to	  whether	  a	  particular	  act	   is	  protected	  under	   the	  Convention.63	   While	   the	   Court	   primarily	   evaluates	   whether	   a	  consensus	   exists	   among	   Council	   of	   Europe	   States,	   it	   also	   looks	  beyond	  Europe	   and	   examines	   other	   States’	   laws,	   treaties,	   cases	  before	   international	   tribunals,	   and	   any	   international	   trends	  toward	   treating	  a	  particular	   right	  as	  being	  encompassed	  within	  one	  of	  the	  fundamental	  rights	  enumerated	  in	  the	  Convention.64	  If	  the	  Court	  finds	  that	  there	  is	  consensus	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  right,	  it	   will	   narrow	   the	   State’s	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   based	   on	   the	  idea	   that	   the	   specific	   act	   has	   become	   a	   core	   right	   within	   the	  
 
	   60.	   See	  Ostrovsky,	  supra	  note	  32,	  at	  51	  (noting	  that	  the	  Court’s	  conception	  of	  a	  “democratic	  society”	  requires	  tolerance	  that	  extends	  beyond	  deference	  to	  individual	  States).	  
	   61.	   See	   Open	   Door	   v.	   Ireland,	   246	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   (ser.	   A)	   at	   30	   (1992)	  (concluding	   that	   Ireland’s	   restrictions	  on	   information	  were	  disproportionate	  to	  the	  aim	  of	  protecting	  public	  morals).	  
	   62.	   See	  id.	  at	  31.	  
	   63.	   See,	  e.g.,	  Evans	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  App.	  No.	  6339/05,	  43	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  409,	   427	   (2006)	   (affording	   a	   wide	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   to	   the	   United	  Kingdom	  in	  regulating	   the	  use	  of	  embryos	  created	  by	   in	  vitro	   fertilization	   in	  part	  because	  there	  is	  no	  European	  consensus	  regarding	  such	  regulation).	  
	   64.	   See,	  e.g.,	  Goodwin	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  2002-­‐VI	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  1,	  10-­‐22,	  29-­‐30,	  32	  (concluding	  that	  the	  United	  Kingdom’s	  failure	  to	  legally	  recognize	  post-­‐operative	   transsexuals’	   sexual	   identity	   violated	   Article	   8	   by	   considering,	   in	  part,	   the	   legal	   recognition	  of	   their	   sexual	   identity	   in	   other	   the	   laws	  of	   other	  European	  States,	  in	  international	  laws,	  and	  in	  international	  treaties).	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2.	   Determining	  the	  Margin	  of	  Appreciation	  and	  Applying	  the	  
Court’s	  “Necessity”	  Analysis	  to	  the	  Right	  to	  Privacy:	  Illustrative	  
Cases	  The	  Court	  has	  had	  many	  opportunities	  to	  determine	  whether	  a	  State’s	  regulation	  of	  a	  fundamental	  privacy	  interest	  is	  “necessary	  to	  a	  democratic	  society”	  and	  does	  not	   improperly	   infringe	  upon	  an	   individual’s	   fundamental	   rights.66	   The	   Court	   examines	   the	  necessity	   of	   a	   State	   restriction	   in	   light	   of	   the	   margin	   of	  appreciation	   it	   affords	   to	   the	   State	   to	   determine	   the	   proper	  balance	  between	  State	  interests	  and	  individual	  rights.	  The	  Court	  determines	   a	   State’s	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   to	   regulate	   a	  particular	   privacy	   interest	   based	   upon	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  regulation,	   the	   act	   or	   right	   being	   regulated,	   and	   European	  consensus.	  When	   the	   Court	   finds	   that	   a	   privacy	   right	   is	   a	   particularly	  important	  facet	  of	  individual	  existence,	  the	  Court	  grants	  States	  a	  narrow	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   to	   restrict	   that	   privacy	   right.67	  Thus,	   the	   State	   may	   infringe	   on	   such	   a	   right	   only	   for	   very	  substantial	   reasons.68	   Even	   where	   the	   Court	   normally	   grants	  States	  a	  wide	  margin	  of	  appreciation,	   the	  Court	  will	  hold	   that	  a	  law	  is	  disproportionate	  to	  a	  State’s	  goals,	  and	  thus	  not	  necessary	  to	  a	  democratic	  society,	  if	  the	  law	  goes	  beyond	  what	  is	  needed	  to	  
 
	   65.	   See	   Ostrovsky,	   supra	   note	   32,	   at	   50-­‐51	   (noting	   that	   European	  consensus	   acts	   as	   a	   “gauge”	   to	   determine	   when	   an	   activity	   has	   become	   a	  fundamental	  European	  right).	  
	   66.	   See	  GOLDHABER,	  supra	  note	  26,	  at	  22-­‐23	  (tracing	  the	  Court’s	  evolution	  in	  privacy	   jurisprudence	   from	   Germany’s	   original	   conception	   of	   protecting	  human	  dignity	  against	  suppression	  by	  a	  totalitarian	  regime	  to	  more	  expansive	  and	  modern	  privacy	  concerns).	  
	   67.	   E.g.,	   Goodwin	   v.	   United	   Kingdom,	   2002-­‐VI	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   at	   27-­‐32	  (determining	   that	   a	   narrow	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   applies	   to	   the	   right	   to	  privacy	  regarding	  the	  sexual	  identity	  of	  post-­‐operative	  transsexuals).	  
	   68.	   See	  MARK	  W.	  JANIS	  ET	  AL.,	  EUROPEAN	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  LAW	  431	  (3d	  ed.	  2008)	  (illustrating	  that	  the	  Court	  has	  extended	  Article	  8	  protection	  to	  group	  sexual	  activity,	  but	  has	  upheld	  State	  intervention	  on	  sado-­‐masochistic	  sexual	  activity	  that	  results	  in	  bleeding	  and	  scarring	  because	  in	  such	  situations	  the	  State	  has	  a	  substantial	  interest	  in	  protecting	  health).	  
	   	  
406	   AM.	  U.	  INT’L	  L.	  REV.	   [27:2	  achieve	   its	   aim	  and	   significantly	   limits	   an	   individual’s	   ability	   to	  exercise	   the	   fundamental	   right.69	   For	   example,	   in	   Dudgeon	   v.	  
United	   Kingdom,	   the	   Court	   found	   that	   a	   Northern	   Irish	   law	  criminalizing	   homosexual	   activity	   between	   consenting	   adult	  males	  violated	  the	  applicant’s	  right	  to	  privacy	  because	  the	  law’s	  blanket	   prohibition	   against	   homosexual	   activity	   was	  disproportionate	   to	  Northern	   Ireland’s	   aim	  of	   protecting	  public	  morals	  and	  thus	  failed	  the	  “necessity”	  analysis.70	  Although	  States	  have	  the	  right	   to	  regulate	   in	  order	   to	  protect	  public	  morals,	   the	  Court	   found	  that	  Northern	  Ireland	  went	  beyond	  what	  the	  Court	  considered	   “necessary,”	   and	   the	   State’s	   aim	   of	   protecting	  vulnerable	  young	  people	  from	  undesirable	  or	  harmful	  pressures	  did	   not	   justify	   an	   absolute	   prohibition	   against	   homosexual	  activity.71	   The	   Court	   placed	   great	   weight	   on	   the	   existing	  European	   consensus	   that	   individuals	   have	   a	   right	   to	   privacy	   in	  sexual	   activity,	   particularly	   focusing	   on	   the	   increased	   tolerance	  regarding	   homosexual	   activity,	   and	   consequently	   found	   that	  because	   of	   this	   consensus,	   the	   usually	   broad	   margin	   of	  appreciation	  granted	  to	  States	  to	  determine	  what	  is	  “necessary”	  to	  protect	  public	  morals	  should	  be	  narrowed.72	  The	  Court	  similarly	  used	  consensus	  to	  narrow	  a	  State’s	  margin	  of	   appreciation	   in	  Goodwin	   v.	   United	   Kingdom,	   when	   the	   Court	  held	   that	   prohibiting	   transsexuals	   from	   legally	   switching	   their	  gender	   violated	   the	   right	   to	   privacy.73	   The	   Court	   examined	  European	   consensus	   surrounding	   the	   issue,	   noted	   the	  Convention’s	  role	   in	  protecting	  this	  right,	  and	  found	  that	  due	  to	  
 
	   69.	   Cf.	  Ostrovsky,	  supra	  note	  32,	  at	  51-­‐53	  (adding	  that	  this	  proportionality	  assessment	   is	   part	   of	   the	   Court’s	   belief	   that	   a	   “democratic	   society”	   requires	  tolerance	  and	  broadmindedness).	  	   70.	   Dudgeon	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  45	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  A)	  at	  24	  (1981);	  see	  GOLDHABER,	  supra	  note	  26,	  at	  38	  (proclaiming	  Dudgeon’s	   status	  as	  a	   “historic	  judgment”	  that	  helped	  clear	  the	  way	  for	  the	  Court’s	  “activist	  agenda”).	  
	   71.	   Dudgeon,	  45	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  A.)	  at	  20,	  23-­‐24.	  
	   72.	   See	   Ostrovsky,	   supra	   note	   32,	   at	   52-­‐54	   (finding	   that	   European	  consensus	   indicated	   that	  homosexual	   sexual	   acts	  between	   consenting	   adults	  had	  become	  a	  core	  right	  within	  Article	  8	  and	  that	  it	  was	  no	  longer	  “necessary	  or	  appropriate”	  to	  prohibit	  such	  acts).	  
	   73.	   See	   Goodwin	   v.	   United	   Kingdom,	   2002-­‐VI	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   1,	   29-­‐30,	   32	  (holding	   that	   although	   European	   countries	   lacked	   consensus	   on	   legal	  recognition	   of	   post-­‐operative	   transsexuals,	   the	   international	   trend	   in	   a	  recognition	  satisfied	  the	  consensus	  analysis).	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  changing	   social	   conditions,	   it	  has	  been	  encompassed	  within	   the	  Convention’s	  fundamental	  right	  to	  privacy.74	  The	  Court	  assessed	  the	   “necessity”	   of	   the	   restrictions	   under	   this	   narrow	  margin	   of	  appreciation	   and	   considered	   the	   detrimental	   psychological	  effects	   the	   regulations	   have	   on	   transsexuals	   and	   the	   lack	   of	  detriment	   that	  would	  occur	   to	   the	  public	   if	   transsexuals	   legally	  claimed	   their	   chosen	   identity.	   The	   Court	   used	   these	  considerations	   to	   hold	   that	   the	   law	  did	   not	   fairly	   balance	   State	  interests	  and	  individual	  rights,	  and	  thus	  violated	  the	  applicant’s	  Article	  8	  right	  to	  privacy.75	  	  As	   highlighted	   by	   Dudgeon	   and	   Goodwin,	   when	   assessing	   a	  State’s	   ability	   to	   impose	   restrictions	   on	   fundamental	   privacy	  rights,	  the	  Court	  often	  narrows	  a	  State’s	  margin	  of	  appreciation.	  The	  Court	  considers	   the	   intimate	  nature	  of	   the	  right	   to	  privacy,	  the	  breadth	  of	  the	  regulation	  and	  its	  effect	  on	  the	  individual,	  and	  consensus	   concerning	   the	   existence	   of	   an	   individual	   right	   to	  demonstrate	   that	   the	   right	   has,	   in	   fact,	   become	   a	   part	   of	   the	  European	   legal	   heritage	   and	   a	   facet	   of	   an	   enumerated	  fundamental	  right,	  such	  as	   the	  right	   to	  privacy.76	   	   In	   light	  of	   the	  applicable	   margin	   of	   appreciation,	   the	   Court	   then	   assesses	  whether	   a	   particular	   restriction	   is	   “necessary	   to	   a	   democratic	  society”	   by	   evaluating	   whether	   the	   State’s	   restriction	   is	  proportional,	   or	   fairly	   balances	   State	   interests	   against	   the	  individual	  right,	  and	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  “pressing	  social	  need”	  for	  the	  restriction.	  B.	   WOMEN’S	  RIGHT	  TO	  ABORTION	  UNDER	  THE	  CONVENTION	  The	  Court	  has	  had	  several	  opportunities	   to	  examine	  abortion	  rights	   under	   the	   Convention,	   but	   has	   neither	   declared	   that	   the	  right	   to	   privacy	   includes	   a	   woman’s	   right	   to	   abortion	   nor	   that	  Article	   2,	   which	   guarantees	   the	   right	   to	   life,77	   extends	   to	   the	  
 
	   74.	   See	   id.	   at	   29,	   31-­‐32	   (announcing	   that	   transsexuals’	   right	   to	   personal	  development	   and	   security	   is	   no	   longer	   so	   controversial	   in	   the	   European	  community	  that	  the	  Court	  must	  grant	  deference	  to	  States’	  decision	  to	  regulate	  the	  right).	  
	   75.	   Id.	  at	  27-­‐28,	  30.	  
	   76.	   See	  Shany,	  supra	  note	  56,	  at	  927.	  
	   77.	   See	  European	  Convention,	  supra	  note	  10,	  art.	  2(1)	  (“Everyone’s	  right	  to	  life	  shall	  be	  protected	  by	  law.”).	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  protection	   of	   a	   fetus.78	   However,	   in	   1977,	   the	   European	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights	  (“the	  Commission”)	  announced	  in	  
Brüggemann	   and	   Scheuten	   v.	   Germany79	   that	   pregnancy	   does	  touch	  upon	  a	  woman’s	  private	  life.80	  The	  Commission	  ultimately	  determined	  that	  not	  every	  regulation	  on	  abortion	  would	  violate	  the	   right	   to	   privacy,	   but	   declined	   to	   decide	   whether	   Article	   2	  protected	  the	  fetus,	  thus	  avoiding	  the	  need	  to	  balance	  the	  right	  to	  life	  against	  a	  woman’s	  right	  to	  health	  and	  well-­‐being.81	  	  In	   1980,	   the	   Commission	   confirmed,	   in	   Paton	   v.	   United	  
Kingdom,	   that	   the	   fetus	   has	   no	   absolute	   right	   to	   life,	   but	   noted	  that	  Article	  2	  may	  afford	  the	  fetus	  some	  protections	  with	  certain	  limitations	   based	   upon	   the	   woman’s	   rights.82	   In	   Paton,	   the	  Commission	   further	   confirmed	   that	  a	  woman’s	   right	   to	  have	  an	  abortion	  under	  the	  Article	  8	  privacy	  rights	  will	  take	  precedence	  over	   the	   father’s	   Article	   8	   privacy	   interest	   in	   keeping	   the	   child	  because	   the	   woman,	   not	   the	   father,	   is	   the	   individual	   primarily	  concerned	  with	  the	  pregnancy.83	  	  In	   2004,	   the	   Court	   once	   again	   avoided	   determining	   whether	  Article	  2	  protects	  the	  fetus	  in	  Vo	  v.	  France,	  which	  reiterated	  that	  a	  
 
	   78.	   See	   JANIS	   ET	   AL.,	   supra	   note	   68,	   at	   435-­‐36	   (discussing	   several	   cases	   in	  which	  the	  Court	  avoided	  making	  either	  pronouncement).	  
	   79.	   Brüggemann	  v.	  Germany	  was	  decided	  by	  the	  European	  Commission	  on	  Human	   Rights	   rather	   than	   the	   Court,	   as	   the	   latter	   did	   not	   begin	   hearing	   all	  cases	  until	  1998.	  See	  generally	  GOLDHABER,	  supra	  note	  26,	  at	  4-­‐6.	  
	   80.	   See	  Brüggemann	  v.	  Germany,	  App.	  No.	  6959/75,	  3	  Eur.	  H.R.	  Rep.	  244,	  253	  (1981)	  (“[P]regnancy	  cannot	  be	  said	  to	  pertain	  uniquely	  to	  the	  sphere	  of	  private	  life.	  Whenever	  a	  woman	  is	  pregnant,	  her	  private	  life	  becomes	  closely	  connected	  with	  the	  developing	  foetus.”).	  
	   81.	   See	  Brüggemann,	   3	   Eur.	   H.R.	   Rep.	   at	   253-­‐55	   (holding	   that	   Germany’s	  protection	  of	  fetal	  life	  was	  justified	  in	  light	  of	  the	  relatively	  restrictive	  policies	  on	  abortion	  of	  all	   contracting	  States	  at	   the	   time	  the	  Convention	  entered	   into	  force).	   But	   see	   Berta	   E.	   Hernández,	   To	   Bear	   or	   Not	   to	   Bear:	   Reproductive	  
Freedom	  as	  an	  International	  Human	  Right,	  17	  BROOK.	  J.	  INT’L	  L.	  309,	  331	  (1991)	  (noting	   that	   in	   the	   years	   since	   Brüggemann,	   nearly	   all	   European	   countries	  have	  liberalized	  their	  abortion	  laws).	  
	   82.	   See	  Paton	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  App.	  No.	  8416/78,	  3	  Eur.	  H.R.	  Rep.	  408,	  415-­‐16	   (1981)	   (reasoning	   that	   if	   the	   fetus	   had	   an	   absolute	   right	   to	   life,	   the	  woman’s	  right	  to	  life	  would	  have	  lesser	  value	  and	  abortion	  would	  be	  banned	  in	  all	  circumstances).	  
	   83.	   See	   id.	   at	   416-­‐17	   (rejecting	   a	   husband’s	   contention	   that	   his	   right	   to	  privacy	   was	   violated	   after	   his	   wife	   procured	   an	   abortion	   to	   protect	   her	  health).	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  fetus	  has	  no	  absolute	  right	  to	  life	  under	  the	  Convention	  and	  that	  even	  if	  a	  fetus	  is	  afforded	  some	  right	  to	  life	  under	  Article	  2,	  any	  such	  right	  will	  be	  limited	  by	  the	  woman’s	  interests.84	  In	  Vo,	  as	  in	  the	  earlier	  cases,	   the	  Court	  deferred	  to	   the	  State’s	   law,	  deciding	  that	  because	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  European	  consensus	  on	  the	  right	  to	  life	  of	   the	   fetus,	   States	   have	   a	   wide	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   to	  determine	   whether	   Article	   2	   covers	   fetal	   life	   within	   their	  borders.85	  	  Finally,	  in	  Tysiąc	  v.	  Poland,	  the	  last	  Court	  decision	  on	  abortion	  rights	   before	   A,	   B	   &	   C,	   the	   Court	   acknowledged	   again	   that	  pregnancy	   implicates	   Article	   8’s	   right	   to	   privacy,	   specifically	   a	  woman’s	   right	   to	   physical	   and	   psychological	   integrity.86	   The	  Court	  did	  not	  address	  the	  substantive	  issue	  of	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  fundamental	   right	   to	   abortion	   under	   Article	   8,	   but	   solely	  addressed	   Poland’s	   lack	   of	   procedural	   safeguards	   to	   ensure	  women	  can	  access	  abortion	  if	  their	  life	  or	  health	  is	  at	  risk,	  cases	  in	  which	  abortion	   is	   lawful	   in	  Poland.87	   In	   sum,	   a	   review	  of	   the	  Court’s	   decisions	   on	   cases	   involving	   abortion	   demonstrate	   that	  while	   the	   Court	   has	   maintained	   that	   pregnancy	   does	   implicate	  women’s	  Article	  8	  privacy	  rights,	   it	  has	   failed	  to	  determine	  that	  the	   right	   to	   an	   abortion	   exists	   as	   a	   fundamental	   right	   under	  Article	  8.	  	  While	  the	  Court	  has	  often	  been	  required	  to	  determine	  whether	  
 
	   84.	   See	  Vo	  v.	  France,	  2004-­‐VIII	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  67,	  75,	  106-­‐07,	  112	  (concluding	  that	   France’s	   administrative	   rather	   than	   criminal	   remedies	   were	   sufficient	  where	  a	  doctor	  accidentally	  ended	  a	  woman’s	  pregnancy).	  
	   85.	   See	   id.	   at	  89-­‐90	   (implying	  some	  emerging	  consensus	  exists	  as	   to	   fetal	  right	   to	   life	   by	   noting	   that	   the	   fetus	   and	   embryo	   are	   beginning	   to	   receive	  certain	  protections	  as	  a	  result	  of	  scientific	  progress).	  
	   86.	   See	  Tysiąc	  v.	  Poland,	  App.	  No.	  5410/03,	  45	  Eur.	  H.R.	  Rep.	  995,	  976-­‐77	  (2007)	   (noting	   that	   the	  State	   is	  obligated	   to	  ensure	   that	   its	   citizens’	   right	   to	  physical	  and	  psychological	  integrity	  is	  respected,	  but	  that	  the	  Convention	  does	  not	  guarantee	  a	  specific	  level	  of	  medical	  care).	  
	   87.	   Id.	  at	  976,	  978-­‐82	  (remarking	  that	   the	  relevant	  Polish	   law,	  enacted	   in	  1993,	   prohibits	   abortion	   except	  when	   two	  medical	   authorities	   certify	   that	   a	  pregnancy,	  at	  any	  stage,	  threatens	  a	  woman’s	  life	  or	  health);	  see	  also	  Shannon	  K.	  Calt,	  A.,	  B.	  &	  C.	  v.	  Ireland:	  “Europe’s	  Roe	  v.	  Wade”?,	  14	  LEWIS	  &	  CLARK	  L.	  REV.	  1189,	   1212-­‐13	   (2010)	   (finding	   that	   the	   Court	   again	   avoided	   determining	  when	   life	   begins	   or	  what	   State	   interest	   the	   restriction	   sought	   to	   protect	   by	  deciding	   only	   that	   Poland’s	   interference	  with	   access	   to	   abortion	  was	   not	   in	  accordance	  with	  Polish	  laws).	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  States	  successfully	  balanced	  two	  individual	  interests	  —	  a	  fetus’s	  Article	  2	  rights	  (if	  any)	  against	  a	  woman’s	  Article	  8	  rights	  —	  the	  Court	   only	   once	   assessed	   State	   abortion	   restrictions	   as	   a	  protection	  of	  public	  morals	  prior	   to	  A,	  B	  &	  C.	   In	  Open	  Door	  and	  
Dublin	   Well	   Woman	   v.	   Ireland,	   the	   Court	   examined	   Ireland’s	  injunction	  against	   the	  dissemination	  of	   information	  on	  abortion	  services	   abroad	  under	  Article	   10,	  which	   guarantees	   freedom	  of	  expression,	  but	  has	  a	  limiting	  clause	  that	  allows	  States	  to	  restrict	  this	   right	   in	   order	   to	   protect	   public	   morals	   similar	   to	   that	   in	  Article	  8.88	  The	  Court	  characterized	  the	  issue	  as	  an	  assessment	  of	  a	  State’s	  ability	   to	  restrict	  access	   to	   information	  on	  abortion	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   the	  public	  moral	  of	  protecting	   fetal	   life.89	  The	  Court	  assessed	   the	   regulation	  based	  upon	   the	   above-­‐noted	   three-­‐part	  analysis,	   focusing	  primarily	  on	   the	   “necessity”	  of	   the	   restriction	  and	  affording	  Ireland	  a	  wide	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  to	  determine	  what	   is	   “necessary”	   because	   of	   the	   State’s	   aim	   of	   protecting	  public	   morals.90	   In	   Open	   Door,	   the	   Court	   ruled	   that	   Ireland’s	  injunction	   against	   disseminating	   information	   on	   procuring	  abortions	  outside	  Ireland	  violated	  Article	  10.91	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  ruling,	   as	   today,	   Ireland	   prohibited	   abortion	   unless	   a	   woman’s	  life	   was	   at	   risk,	   but	   it	   did	   not	   prevent	   a	   woman	   from	   leaving	  Ireland	   to	   obtain	   an	   abortion.92	   The	   Court	   determined	   that	   the	  sweeping	   injunction	  was	  disproportionate	   to	  protecting	  morals,	  
 
	   88.	   See	  Open	  Door	  v.	  Ireland,	  246	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  A)	  at	  11,	  20	  (1992);	  see	  
also	  European	  Convention,	  supra	  note	  10,	  art.	  10	  (“Everyone	  has	  the	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  expression	  .	  .	  .	  The	  exercise	  of	  these	  freedoms,	  since	  it	  carries	  with	  it	   duties	   and	   responsibilities,	  may	  be	   subject	   to	   such	   formalities,	   conditions,	  restrictions	  or	  penalties	  as	  are	  prescribed	  by	  law	  and	  are	  necessary	  .	  .	  .	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  health	  or	  morals	  .	  .	  .	  .”).	  
	   89.	   See	  Open	  Door	  v.	  Ireland,	  246	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  A)	  at	  27	  (1992)	  (“The	  restriction	  .	  .	  .	  pursued	  the	  legitimate	  aim	  of	  the	  protection	  of	  morals	  of	  which	  the	  protection	  in	  Ireland	  of	  the	  right	  to	  life	  of	  the	  unborn	  is	  one	  aspect.”).	  
	   90.	   See	   id.	   at	   25-­‐32	   (concluding	   that	   Ireland’s	   injunction	   was	  disproportionate	   to	   the	   aim	   of	   protecting	   morals	   and	   not	   “necessary	   to	   a	  democratic	  society”).	  
	   91.	   Id.	  at	  32.	  
	   92.	   See	  IR.	  CONST.,	  1937,	  art.	  40.3.3,	  available	  at	  http://www.	  constitution.org/cons/ireland/constitution_ireland-­‐en.htm	   (“The	   State	  acknowledges	  the	  right	  to	  life	  of	  the	  unborn	  and,	  with	  due	  regard	  to	  the	  equal	  right	   to	   life	   of	   the	   mother,	   guarantees	   in	   its	   laws	   to	   respect,	   and,	   as	   far	   as	  practicable,	   by	   its	   laws	   to	   defend	   and	   vindicate	   that	   right.	   This	   subsection	  shall	  not	  limit	  freedom	  to	  travel	  between	  the	  State	  and	  another	  state.”).	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  even	  when	  such	  morals	   include	   the	  protection	  of	   fetal	   life.	   	  The	  Court	   came	   to	   this	   conclusion	   by	   finding	   that	   the	   injunction	  prohibited	   all	   women	   from	   accessing	   information	   on	   safe	  abortions	   without	   accounting	   for	   the	   various	   reasons	   women	  may	  seek	  such	  information	  or	  the	  potential	  effects	  the	  injunction	  may	   have	   on	   a	   woman’s	   health.93	   Although	   the	   Court	   granted	  Ireland	   a	   wide	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   to	   determine	   if	   this	  injunction	   was	   “necessary	   to	   a	   democratic	   society,”	   the	   Court	  held	  that	  the	  injunction’s	  blanket	  ban	  on	  information	  concerning	  obtaining	   abortions	   outside	   of	   Ireland	   exceeded	   even	   this	  wide	  margin	  of	  appreciation.94	  	  Although	   the	   Court	   has	   assessed	   cases	   involving	   abortion,	   it	  has	  yet	  to	  find	  that	  abortion,	  even	  if	  protected	  under	  Article	  8,	  is	  an	   important	   enough	   facet	   of	   a	   woman’s	   existence	   to	   justify	   a	  narrow	  margin	  of	  appreciation95	  —	  nor	  did	  it	  do	  so	  in	  A,	  B	  &	  C.	  C.	   A,	  B	  &	  C	  V.	  IRELAND	  Ireland’s	   strict	  abortion	   laws,	  which	  have	  existed	  since	  1861,	  criminalize	   abortion	   and	   establish	   a	   maximum	   sentence	   of	   life	  imprisonment	   for	   women	   who	   procure	   abortions.96	   In	   1983,	  
 
	   93.	   See	   Open	   Door	   v.	   Ireland,	   246	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   (ser.	   A)	   at	   30-­‐32	   (1992)	  (explaining	   that	   limitations	   on	   information	   about	   activities	   that	   are	   legal	   in	  other	   countries	   require	   careful	   scrutiny	   by	   the	   Court	   to	   ensure	   that	   they	  conform	  with	  the	  needs	  of	  a	  democratic	  society).	  The	  Court	  additionally	  noted	  that	   the	   injunction	   was	   ineffective	   in	   protecting	   the	   “public	   moral”	   of	  protecting	  fetal	  life	  because	  many	  Irish	  women	  continued	  to	  obtain	  abortions	  overseas.	  Id.	  at	  31;	  see	  also	  Abortion	  Statistics,	  supra	  note	  1	  and	  accompanying	  text.	  
	   94.	   See	   Open	   Door	   v.	   Ireland,	   246	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   (ser.	   A)	   at	   29,	   32	   (1992)	  (asserting	  that	  a	  State’s	  wide	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  is	  not	  unlimited	  and	  the	  Court	   must	   supervise	   whether	   restrictions	   are	   compatible	   with	   the	  Convention).	  
	   95.	   See	  Natalie	  Klashtorny,	  Comment,	   Ireland’s	  Abortion	  Law:	  An	  Abuse	  of	  
International	  Law,	  10	  TEMP.	  INT’L	  &	  COMP.	  L.J.	  419,	  439-­‐40	  (1996)	  (arguing	  that	  “unwanted	   pregnancy,	   which	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   affect	   every	   aspect	   of	   a	  woman’s	   life,	  should	  be	  considered	  sufficiently	  private	  for	  a	  Court	  to	  apply	  a	  narrow	  margin	   of	   appreciation,”	   just	   as	   the	   Court	   has	   done	   for	   sodomy	   and	  illegitimacy).	  
	   96.	   See	  Offences	  Against	  the	  Person	  Act,	  1861,	  24	  &	  25	  Vict.,	  c.	  100,	  §§	  58-­‐59	   (U.K.)	   (finding	   any	   woman	   who	   procures	   an	   abortion	   guilty	   of	   a	   felony,	  imposing	  a	  minimum	  sentence	  of	  three-­‐years’	  imprisonment,	  and	  any	  person	  assisting	  a	  woman	  in	  doing	  so	  guilty	  of	  a	  misdemeanor).	  
	   	  
412	   AM.	  U.	  INT’L	  L.	  REV.	   [27:2	  Ireland	   enacted	   Article	   40.3.3	   of	   the	   Constitution,	   which	  explicitly	   grants	   the	   fetus	   a	   right	   to	   life	   equal	   to	   that	   of	   the	  woman’s.97	   In	   1992,	   the	   Irish	   Supreme	   Court’s	   ruling	   in	   the	  highly	  publicized	  case,	  Attorney	  General	  v.	  X,	   interpreted	  Article	  40.3.3	  to	  include	  an	  exception	  to	  the	  ban	  on	  abortion	  when	  there	  is	  a	  substantial	  risk	  to	  the	  life	  of	  the	  woman,	  including	  suicide.98	  	  In	  1992,	  the	  Thirteenth	  and	  Fourteenth	  Amendments	  to	  the	  Irish	  Constitution	   passed	   by	   two	   referendums,	   largely	   in	   reaction	   to	  the	   Irish	   Supreme	   Court’s	   decisions	   in	   S.P.U.C.	   v.	   Open	   Door	  
Counselling99	  (which	  led	  to	  the	  European	  Court	  case,	  Open	  Door,	  discussed	  above)	  and	  Attorney	  General	  v.	  X.100	  Article	  40.3.3	  now	  incorporates	   these	   amendments	   and,	   in	   addition	   to	   protecting	  the	  life	  of	  the	  fetus,	  expressly	  states	  that	  Irish	  law	  does	  not	  limit	  
 
	   97.	   See	  IR.	  CONST.,	  1937,	  art.	  40.3.3,	  available	  at	  http://www.	  constitution.org/cons/ireland/constitution_ireland-­‐en.htm	   (promising	   to	  protect	  the	  fetus’s	  right	  to	  life	  while	  also	  considering	  the	  “equal	  right	  to	  life	  of	  the	  mother”).	  
	   98.	   See	   Att’y	   Gen.	   v.	   X,	   [1992]	   1	   I.R.	   1,	   6-­‐7,	   54-­‐55	   (Ir.)	   (finding	   that	   a	  fourteen-­‐year-­‐old	  rape	  victim’s	  threat	  to	  commit	  suicide	  if	  forced	  to	  continue	  her	   pregnancy	   constituted	   a	   substantial	   risk	   to	   her	   life	   such	   that	   Ireland	  improperly	  prevented	  her	  from	  traveling	  abroad	  to	  obtain	  an	  abortion).	  The	  X	  case	   involved	   a	   fourteen-­‐year-­‐old	   girl	   who	   had	   been	   raped	   by	   her	   friend’s	  father	  and	  became	  pregnant	  as	  a	  result.	  Id.	  at	  6-­‐7.	  The	  Irish	  Attorney	  General	  obtained	  an	  injunction	  requiring	  X	  to	  remain	  in	  Ireland	  so	  that	  she	  would	  be	  unable	   to	   obtain	   an	   abortion.	   Id.	   at	   5-­‐6.	   In	   finding	   that	   Ireland	   improperly	  restricted	  X’s	  ability	  to	  obtain	  an	  abortion	  abroad,	  the	  Court	  reinterpreted	  the	  text	  of	  the	  Irish	  Constitution	  to	  mean	  that	  Irish	  women	  may	  procure	  abortions	  if,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  probability,	   there	   is	  a	  real	  and	  substantial	  risk	  to	  the	   life	  of	  the	   mother,	   including	   the	   risk	   of	   suicide,	   that	   can	   only	   be	   avoided	   by	   an	  abortion.	  Id.	  at	  52-­‐54.	  
	   99.	   See	   Soc’y	   for	   Protection	   of	  Unborn	   Children	   Ir.	   Ltd.	   (S.P.U.C.)	   v.	   Open	  Door	   Counselling	   Ltd.,	   [1988]	   I.R.	   593	   (H.	   Ct.)	   (Ir.),	  aff’d	   in	   part	   and	   rev’d	   in	  
part,	  [1989]	  I.R.	  618	  (S.C.)	  (Ir.)	  (enacting	  the	  injunction	  against	  disseminating	  information	   on	   obtaining	   abortion	   services	   abroad,	  which	   led	  Open	  Door	   to	  file	  an	  action	  in	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights).	  
	   100.	   See	   Calt,	   supra	   note	   87,	   at	   1200-­‐01	   (discussing	   the	   1992	   referendum	  that	  arose	  after	  the	  “public	  outcry”	  from	  the	  X	  case	  and	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	   Rights	   ruling	   in	  Open	   Door,	   which	   expanded	   Irish	   abortion	   law	   and	  brought	   it	   into	   compliance	  with	   the	   Court’s	   holding	   in	  Open	   Door);	   see	   also	  Jeffrey	  A.	  Weinstein,	  Comment,	  “An	  Irish	  Solution	  to	  an	  Irish	  Problem”:	  Ireland’s	  
Struggle	   with	   Abortion	   Law,	   10	   ARIZ.	   J.	   INT’L	   &	   COMP.	   L.	   165,	   198	   (1993)	  (observing	  that	  the	  referendum	  on	  the	  right	  to	  travel	  passed	  62.3%	  to	  37.7%,	  the	  referendum	  on	  access	  to	  information	  passed	  59.8%	  to	  40.2%,	  and	  a	  third	  referendum	  that	  would	  have	  eliminated	  the	  right	  to	  abortion	  when	  there	  was	  a	  risk	  of	  the	  mother	  committing	  suicide	  was	  defeated	  65.4%	  to	  34.6%).	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  a	   woman’s	   freedom	   to	   travel	   or	   the	   freedom	   to	   distribute	  information	   on	   services	   available	   outside	   Ireland.101	   Even	   with	  these	   amendments,	   Irish	   law	   still	   bans	   abortion	  within	   Ireland	  unless	   the	   woman’s	   life	   is	   at	   risk	   and	   has	   no	   exceptions	   for	  health,	   rape,	   or	   incest.102	   Abortion	   in	   Ireland	   has	   long	   been	   the	  subject	  of	  debate,	  both	   in	  and	  out	  of	   Ireland,	   103	  and	  on	   July	  15,	  2005,	   three	  Irish	  women,	  A,	  B,	  and	  C,	  brought	  a	  case	  before	  the	  Court	  challenging	  Irish	  abortion	  law.	  
1.	   Background	  to	  the	  Applicants’	  Claims	  On	  July	  15,	  2005,	  A,	  B	  &	  C,	  all	  women	  who	  procured	  abortions	  in	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   because	   of	   Ireland’s	   abortion	   ban,	  brought	   a	   case	   to	   the	  Court	   challenging	   Irish	   abortion	   law	   as	   a	  violation	  of	  the	  women’s	  right	  to	  physical	  and	  mental	  health,	  as	  guaranteed	   under	   Article	   8	   of	   the	   Convention.104	   The	   first	  applicant,	  A,	  was	  unmarried,	  unemployed,	  and	  lived	  in	  poverty.105	  	  She	  had	  four	  children,	  who	  were	  all	  in	  foster	  care,	  and	  she	  was	  a	  recovering	  alcoholic.106	  Because	  she	  believed	  having	  a	  fifth	  child	  would	   threaten	  her	  recovery	   from	  alcoholism	  and	  her	  ability	   to	  obtain	  custody	  of	  her	  other	  children,	  A	  traveled	  to	  England	  alone	  
 
	   101.	   See	  IR.	  CONST.,	  1937,	  art.	  40.3.3,	  available	  at	  http://www.	  constitution.org/cons/ireland/constitution_ireland-­‐en.htm	   (“This	   subsection	  [on	   the	  right	   to	   life	  of	   the	  unborn]	  shall	  not	   limit	   freedom	  to	   travel	  between	  the	  State	  and	  another	  state.	  This	  subsection	  shall	  not	  limit	  freedom	  to	  obtain	  or	   make	   available	   .	   .	   .	   information	   relating	   to	   services	   lawfully	   available	   in	  another	  state.”).	  
	   102.	   Cf.	  Calt,	  supra	  note	  87,	  at	  1201-­‐02	  (noting	  the	  narrow	  defeat	  of	  another	  referendum	   in	   2002	   that	  would	   have	   removed	  potential	   suicide	   as	   a	   risk	   to	  life,	   and	   finding	   that	  due	   to	   “legislative	  stagnation,”	   Ireland	  has	   “no	  effective	  legislative	  guidelines	  clarifying	  the	  law	  surrounding	  abortion”).	  
	   103.	   See	   Abortion	   in	   Ireland:	   Legal	   Timeline,	   IR.	   FAMILY	   PLANNING	   ASS’N,	  http://www.ifpa.ie/eng/Hot-­‐Topics/Abortion/Abortion-­‐in-­‐Ireland-­‐Legal-­‐Timeline	  (last	  visited	  Sept.	  18,	  2011)	  (detailing	  major	  controversies	  and	  legal	  developments	  relating	  to	  abortion	  in	  Ireland	  since	  1861,	  some	  handled	  at	  the	  European	  rather	  than	  the	  Irish	  level).	  	   104.	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   App.	   No.	   25579/05,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   1-­‐5	   (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4	  &portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en.	  
	   105.	   Id.	  at	  3.	  
	   106.	   Id.	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  and	   in	   secrecy	   to	   obtain	   an	   abortion.107	   A	   delayed	  her	   abortion	  for	   three	   weeks	   in	   order	   to	   borrow	   650	   Euros	   (approximately	  $933	   USD)	   from	   a	   moneylender	   at	   a	   high	   interest	   rate	   so	   she	  could	   pay	   for	   her	   abortion	   care	   and	   travel	   costs.108	   The	   second	  applicant,	   B,	   traveled	   to	   England	   to	   obtain	   an	   abortion	   using	   a	  friend’s	  credit	  card	  to	  pay	  for	  her	  flights	  after	  being	  told	  that	  she	  would	   have	   an	   ectopic	   pregnancy.109	   Her	   trip	   was	   delayed	  because	   a	   Dublin	   counseling	   center	   she	   intended	   to	   visit	   was	  closed	   for	   Christmas,	   requiring	   her	   to	  wait	   until	   it	   reopened.110	  Finally,	   C,	   a	   cancer	   patient,	   sought	   an	   abortion	   in	   England	  because	  doctors	  in	  Ireland	  would	  not	  tell	  her	  how	  the	  pregnancy	  could	   affect	   her	   cancer	   or	   how	   chemotherapy	  would	   affect	   the	  fetus.111	   As	   previously	   noted,	   because	   the	   Court	   found	   that	  Ireland	   violated	   C’s	   right	   to	   privacy	   and	   applied	   different	  standards	  than	  it	  did	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  A	  and	  B,	  this	  Comment	  will	  not	  focus	  on	  C,112	  and	  instead	  focuses	  only	  on	  the	  Court’s	  holding	  regarding	  applicants	  A	  and	  B.	  	  
2.	   The	  Parties’	  Arguments	  	  The	  Irish	  government	  argued	  that	   its	  restrictions	  on	  abortion	  do	   not	   violate	  Article	   8	   because	   the	   laws	  pursue	   the	   legitimate	  aim	   of	   protecting	   public	   morals,	   specifically	   the	   protection	   of	  fetal	   life.113	   The	   government	   further	   argued	   that	   Ireland	   had	   a	  wide	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  because	  the	  law	  required	  balancing	  
 
	   107.	   Id.	  at	  3-­‐4.	  
	   108.	   Id.	  at	  4.	  
	   109.	   Id.	  at	  4.	  	   110.	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   App.	   No.	   25579/05,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   4	   (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en	  
	   111.	   Id.	  at	  5.	  
	   112.	   See	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   supra	   note	   7	   and	   accompanying	   text	   (discussing	   the	  Court’s	  ruling	  that	  Ireland	  violated	  C’s	  right	  to	  privacy	  by	  failing	  to	  provide	  a	  proper	  framework	  to	  procure	  an	  abortion,	  despite	  a	  legal	  right	  to	  do	  so,	  when	  C	  had	  a	  justifiable	  fear	  that	  the	  pregnancy	  put	  her	  life	  at	  risk).	  	   113.	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   App.	   No.	   25579/05,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   51	   (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4&portal	  =hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en	   (contending	   initially	   that	   Article	   8	   did	   not	   apply	   to	   the	   case	   because	   the	  lack	   of	   consensus	   favoring	   greater	   access	   to	   abortion	   among	   the	   Council	   of	  Europe	  States	  indicated	  that	  the	  issue	  should	  be	  handled	  at	  the	  State	  level).	  
	   	  
2012]	   REPRODUCTIVE	  CHOICE	   415	  a	   delicate	   and	   complex	   public	   morals	   issue	   against	   the	  applicants’	  Article	  8	  rights.114	  In	  opposition,	  A	  and	  B	  claimed	  that	  Ireland	  violated	  their	  right	  to	   privacy	   because	   Irish	   abortion	   laws	   did	   not	   fall	   within	   the	  bounds	  of	  the	  Article	  8(2)	  three-­‐prong	  analysis.115	  The	  applicants	  argued	  that	  forcing	  women	  to	  travel	  abroad	  for	  abortions	  when	  their	   health	   and	  well-­‐being	   are	   at	   risk	  was	   disproportionate	   to	  protecting	   any	   aim	   pursued,	   including	   public	   morals,	   and	   that	  Irish	  law	  contradicts	  European	  consensus	  permitting	  abortion	  to	  preserve	  women’s	  health	  and	  well-­‐being.116	  	  
3.	   The	  Court’s	  Analysis	  Although	  the	  Court	  acknowledged	  the	  psychological,	  physical,	  and	  financial	  burdens	  that	  A	  and	  B	  faced	  by	  being	  forced	  to	  travel	  abroad	   for	   an	   abortion,	   the	   Court	   ultimately	   held	   that	   right	   to	  travel	   to	   obtain	   an	   abortion	   satisfied	   Article	   8’s	   “necessity”	  analysis.117	   In	  reaching	   its	  conclusion,	   the	  Court,	   following	  prior	  case	  law	  on	  abortion,	   found	  that	   legislation	  restricting	  access	  to	  abortion	   touches	   upon	   the	   private	   life	   of	   a	  woman,	   including	   a	  woman’s	  physical	  and	  psychological	  integrity,	  and	  that	  Irish	  laws	  amounted	   to	  an	   interference	  with	  women’s	  private	   lives.118	  The	  Court,	   however,	   examined	  whether	   Ireland’s	   failure	   to	   have	   an	  exception	  to	  its	  abortion	  ban	  for	  women’s	  health	  and	  well-­‐being	  was	   justified	   as	   a	   fair	   balance	   between	   the	   applicants’	   right	   to	  privacy	   and	   the	  moral	   values	   of	   the	   Irish	   people	   regarding	   the	  
 
	   114.	   Id.	  at	  55.	  
	   115.	   See	   id.	   at	   32,	   47-­‐49,	   75-­‐76	   (noting	   that	   A	   and	   B	   argued	   that	   Ireland	  additionally	   violated	   other	   provisions	   of	   the	   Convention,	   such	   as	   Articles	   3	  (inhumane	   treatment),	   13	   (effective	   domestic	   remedy),	   and	   14	  (discrimination),	   but	   the	   Court	   either	   dismissed	   these	   complaints	   or	   found	  addressing	  them	  unnecessary).	  
	   116.	   See	   id.	   at	  47-­‐49	   (arguing	   that	   Ireland’s	  policies	  on	  abortion	  no	   longer	  reflected	  national	  public	  opinion	  and	  were	  in	  “stark	  contrast”	  to	  more	  liberal	  views	  “for	  which	  there	  was	  a	  clear	  European	  and	  international	  consensus”).	  
	   117.	   See	   id.	   at	   36-­‐37,	   68	   (acknowledging	   the	   stigma	   associated	   with	  abortion	   in	   Ireland,	   the	   financial	  burden	  of	   traveling,	  especially	  upon	  A,	  who	  lived	   in	   poverty,	   and	   that	   the	   process	   would	   have	   been	   considerably	   less	  physically	  burdensome	  if	  abortions	  were	  available	  in	  Ireland).	  
	   118.	   See	   id.	   at	   60-­‐61;	   see	   also	   discussion	   infra	   Part	   II.B	   (discussing	   the	  Court’s	  major	  case	  law	  pertaining	  to	  abortion	  prior	  to	  A,	  B	  &	  C).	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  nature	  of	  fetal	  life.119	  Because	  Ireland’s	  aim	  was	  to	  protect	  public	  morals,	  the	  Court	  granted	  Ireland	  a	  wide	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  to	   strike	   such	   a	   balance.120	   The	   Court	   refused	   to	   narrow	   the	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  because	  it	  found	  that	  no	  consensus	  exists	  on	   when	   life	   begins.121	   The	   Court	   did	   not,	   however,	   examine	  whether	   a	   consensus	   exists	   concerning	   a	   health	   and	  well-­‐being	  exception	   for	   States’	   abortion	   restrictions.	   Ultimately,	   the	  complications	   and	   burdens	   A	   and	   B	   faced	   by	   being	   forced	   to	  travel	  to	  exercise	  their	  right	  to	  privacy	  were	  not	  redressed	  by	  the	  Court.	  	   III.	  	  ANALYSIS	  The	   international	   community	   has	   long	   been	   concerned	   with	  Ireland’s	   sweeping	   abortion	   laws	   that	   only	   permit	   women	   to	  have	  abortions	  when	  their	  lives	  are	  substantially	  at	  risk.	  As	  many	  feminist	   legal	   scholars	   push	   for	   an	   international	   right	   to	  abortion,	   a	   State’s	   ability	   to	   infringe	   on	   a	  woman’s	   freedom	   to	  make	  her	  own	  reproductive	  decisions	  has	  been	  scrutinized	  as	  a	  violation	   of	  women’s	   fundamental	   rights,	   including	   the	   right	   to	  privacy.122	   Despite	   building	   international	   pressure	   to	   declare	   a	  fundamental	   right	   to	   abortion	   to	   protect	   a	  woman’s	   health	   and	  well-­‐being,123	  the	  Court	  in	  A,	  B	  &	  C	  failed	  to	  establish	  such	  a	  right	  
 	   119.	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   App.	   No.	   25579/05,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   64	   (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en.	  
	   120.	   See	   id.	   at	   65	   (maintaining	   that	   a	   wide	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   is	   “in	  principle”	  appropriate	  given	  the	  moral	  and	  ethical	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  issue	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  protecting	  fetal	  life).	  But	  cf.	  id.	  at	  66-­‐67	  (affirming	  that	  the	  fetus	  is	  not	  entitled	  to	  unlimited	  protection	  over	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  mother).	  
	   121.	   See	   id.	  at	  65-­‐66	  (citing	  Vo	   to	  support	   its	  ruling	  that	  despite	  consensus	  among	   most	   European	   States	   towards	   permitting	   abortion	   on	   broader	  grounds	  than	  is	  allowed	  in	  Ireland,	   the	   lack	  of	  European	  consensus	  on	  when	  life	   begins	   warrants	   granting	   States	   a	   wide	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   when	  balancing	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  fetus	  with	  those	  of	  the	  woman).	  
	   122.	   See	   generally	   Rebecca	   Cook,	   International	   Protection	   of	   Women’s	  
Reproductive	  Rights,	  24	  N.Y.U.	   J.	   INT’L	  L.	  &	  POL.	  645	  (1992)	  (arguing	  that	   laws	  limiting	   reproductive	   rights	   reflect	   the	   States’	   desire	   to	   control	   women’s	  behavior	   in	   order	   to	   uphold	  women’s	   traditional	   role	   in	   society	   as	  mothers	  and	  caregivers).	  
	   123.	   See,	   e.g.,	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   App.	   No.	   25579/05,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   30-­‐31	   (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4	  &portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=
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  by	  determining	  that	   Ireland	  has	  a	  broad	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  to	   restrict	   women’s	   right	   to	   privacy	   in	   order	   to	   protect	   public	  morals.	   	   The	   Court	   found	   that	   Ireland’s	   restrictions	   were	  “necessary”	   under	   Article	   8(2),	   and	   upheld	   Ireland’s	   restrictive	  abortion	  laws.	  The	  Court	  held	  that	  Ireland’s	  blanket	  restrictions	  on	  abortion	  did	  not	  exceed	  its	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  to	  restrict	  the	  fundamental	  right	  to	  privacy.	  	  While	  privacy	  rights	  may	  be	  limited	  to	  some	  extent	  by	  a	  State,	  a	   State	   may	   only	   enact	   “necessary”	   regulations	   in	   light	   of	   the	  State’s	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  for	  that	  particular	  right.	  However,	  in	  A,	  B	  &	  C,	  the	  Court	  misapplied	  the	  “necessity”	  analysis	  used	  in	  its	   past	   case	   law	   by	   incorrectly	   holding	   that	   Ireland’s	   abortion	  laws	   are	   proportionate	   to	   its	   aim	   of	   protecting	   public	   morals.	  Further,	  the	  Court	  failed	  to	  properly	  consider	  as	  a	  limiting	  factor	  the	  existing	  European	  consensus	  on	  a	  woman’s	  right	  to	  abortion	  when	  her	  health	  is	  at	  risk	  when	  it	  determined	  Ireland’s	  margin	  of	  appreciation	   to	   restrict	   this	   right.	   In	   failing	   to	   use	   the	   analysis	  firmly	   established	   in	   its	   case	   law,	   the	   Court	   effectively	   granted	  Ireland	  unlimited	  discretion	  to	  regulate	  women’s	  right	  to	  health	  and	   well-­‐being	   under	   Article	   8(2).	   A,	   B	   &	   C	   creates	   dangerous	  precedent	  for	  future	  cases	  involving	  women’s	  access	  to	  abortion	  when	   their	   health	   and	   well-­‐being	   are	   at	   risk	   because	   the	   case	  found	   that	   sweeping	  bans	  based	  upon	  protecting	  public	  morals	  will	   not	   exceed	   a	   State’s	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   to	   control	  women’s	  access	  to	  abortion.124	  	  
 hudoc-­‐en	   (quoting	   Parliamentary	   Assembly	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	  Resolution	   1607,	   which	   affirms	   women’s	   right	   to	   respect	   for	   their	   physical	  integrity	  and	  liberty	  to	  control	  their	  bodies,	  and	  urges	  States	  to	  decriminalize	  abortion	  “within	  reasonable	  gestational	   limits”);	  see	  also	  Christina	  Zampas	  &	  Jaime	   M.	   Gher,	   Abortion	   as	   a	   Human	   Right—International	   and	   Regional	  
Standards,	   8	   HUM.	   RTS.	   L.	   REV.	   249,	   250-­‐52	   (2008)	   (commenting	   on	  international	  instruments	  and	  conferences	  that	  advocate	  for	  women’s	  right	  to	  abortion,	   including	   the	   Protocol	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	  Women	   in	   Africa,	   the	   first	  treaty	  to	  explicitly	  discuss	  abortion	  as	  a	  human	  right).	  
	   124.	   But	   see	   Sarah	   Lyall,	  European	   Court	   Rules	   Against	   Irish	   Abortion	   Law,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Dec.	  16,	  2010,	  http://www.nytimes.com	  /2010/12/17/world/europe/17ireland.html	   (suggesting	   that	   the	   ruling	   is	   a	  step	  forward	  for	  abortion	  rights	  in	  Ireland	  because	  the	  Court’s	  holding	  in	  C’s	  case	  will	  likely	  force	  the	  Irish	  government	  to	  pass	  legislation	  specifying	  when	  abortion	  is	  permissible	  due	  to	  life-­‐threatening	  circumstances).	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   AM.	  U.	  INT’L	  L.	  REV.	   [27:2	  A.	   THE	  COURT	  ERRED	  IN	  UPHOLDING	  IRELAND’S	  ABORTION	  LAWS	  BECAUSE	  IT	  FAILED	  TO	  ACCOUNT	  FOR	  THE	  LAW’S	  SWEEPING	  INFRINGEMENTS	  ON	  WOMEN’S	  RIGHT	  TO	  HEALTH	  AND	  WELL-­‐BEING	  Although	  the	  Convention	  does	  not	  explicitly	  require	  the	  Court	  to	   follow	   precedent,	   the	   Court	   has	   held	   that	   it	   considers	   itself	  bound	   to	   follow	   its	   prior	   case	   law	   and	   consistently	   does	   so.125	  Further,	   the	   Court	   consistently	   employs	   the	   same	   factors	   to	  assess	   a	   law’s	   proportionality,	   determine	   whether	   State	  restrictions	   on	   fundamental	   rights	   exceed	   their	   margin	   of	  appreciation,	   and	   decide	   what	   is	   “necessary	   to	   a	   democratic	  society.”	  	  These	  factors	  include	  the	  breadth	  of	  the	  regulation,	  the	  regulation’s	   effect	   on	   the	   individual	   right	   it	   restricts,	   and	  European	  consensus.126	  To	  this	  end,	  the	  Court	  in	  A,	  B	  &	  C	  failed	  to	  adequately	  account	  for	  past	  case	  law	  that	  found	  that	  restrictions	  analogous	   to	   Ireland’s	   sweeping	   abortion	   laws	   were	   not	  “necessary”	   because	   they	   were	   disproportionate	   to	   the	   State’s	  aim	  and	  did	  not	  properly	  address	  a	  pressing	  social	  need.	  	  Although	   the	   Court	   grants	   States	   a	   wide	   margin	   of	  appreciation	   to	   regulate	   public	  morals,	   the	   Court	   has	   regularly	  held	   that	   States	   exceed	   this	   wide	  margin	   or	   has	   narrowed	   the	  State’s	   margin	   when	   the	   infringement	   is	   especially	   intrusive	  upon	  a	  particularly	  important	  individual	  right,	  such	  as	  privacy.127	  Because	   Irish	  abortion	   law	  puts	  women’s	  health	  and	  well-­‐being	  at	  risk	  by	  enacting	  a	  sweeping	  ban	  on	  abortion,	  the	  Court	  should	  have	   narrowed	   Ireland’s	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   based	   upon	  
 
	   125.	   See	  Alec	   Stone	  Sweet,	  On	   the	  Constitutionalisation	  of	   the	  Convention:	  The	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights	   as	   a	   Constitutional	   Court	   4	   (October	  2009),	   available	   at	  http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1032&context=alec_stone_sweet	   (explaining	   that	   the	   Court	   will	   only	   abandon	   its	   precedent	   to	  correct	  an	  earlier	  error	  or	  to	  reflect	  social	  changes).	  
	   126.	   See	   Shany,	   supra	   note	   56,	   at	   926-­‐27	   (noting	   that	   the	   Court	   is	  “renowned”	   in	   its	   “extensive	   application”	   of	   the	   margin	   of	   appreciation	  doctrine,	  and	  citing	  numerous	  cases	  in	  which	  it	  has	  done	  so).	  
	   127.	   See	   Hilary	   Charlesworth	   et	   al.,	   Resolving	   Conflicting	   Human	   Rights	  
Standards	   in	   International	   Law,	   85	   AM.	   SOC’Y	   INT’L	   L.	   PROC.	   336,	   339	   (1991)	  (reviewing	   two	   hundred	   cases	   and	   finding	   that	   the	   Court	   applies	   a	   narrow	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  when	  the	  individual	  right	  is	  particularly	  important,	  the	  infringement	  on	  the	  right	   is	  great,	   the	  aim	  of	  the	   law	  is	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  or	  consensus	  exists	  among	  the	  contracting	  parties).	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  prior	  case	  law	  and	  found	  that	  the	  Irish	  laws	  did	  not	  successfully	  balance	  State	  and	  individual	  rights.128	  	  
1.	   A,	  B	  &	  C	  Failed	  to	  Follow	  its	  Holding	  in	  Open	  Door	  to	  Find	  that	  
Ireland	  Exceeded	  its	  Margin	  of	  Appreciation	  Although	   the	   Court	   in	   A,	   B	   &	   C	   acknowledged	   that	   Ireland’s	  restrictive	   abortion	   laws	   fall	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   right	   to	  privacy	   under	   Article	   8(1),129	   it	   failed,	   in	   light	   of	   the	   Court’s	  holding	   in	   Open	   Door,	   to	   properly	   assess	   Ireland’s	   ability	   to	  restrict	   the	  right	   to	  privacy	  under	  Article	  8(2).	  The	  Court	   failed	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  proportionality	  analysis	  presented	  in	  Open	  Door,	  taking	  no	  account	  of	  Irish	  abortion	  law’s	  absolute	  prohibition	  on	  abortion	   within	   the	   country	   except	   where	   a	   woman’s	   life	   is	   at	  risk.130	   In	   Open	   Door,	   the	   Court	   protected	   women’s	   access	   to	  abortion	   services	   by	   refusing	   to	   grant	   Ireland	   unfettered	  discretion	  to	  restrict	  women’s	  access	  to	  information	  on	  abortion,	  finding	   that	   Ireland	   exceeded	   even	   the	   broad	   margin	   of	  appreciation	  granted	  to	  regulate	  public	  morals.131	  Because	  Open	  
Door	   is	   the	   only	   other	   case	   in	  which	   the	   Court	   has	   specifically	  assessed	   a	   State’s	   restriction	   on	  women’s	   access	   to	   abortion	   in	  pursuit	  of	  protecting	  public	  morals,	  the	  Court	  in	  A,	  B	  &	  C	  should	  have	   employed	   a	   similar	   analysis.132	   In	   Open	   Door,	   the	   Court	  
 
	   128.	   See	   Stijn	   Smet,	   A.,	   B.	   &	   C.	   v.	   Ireland:	   Abortion	   and	   the	   Margin	   of	  
Appreciation,	   STRASBOURG	   OBSERVERS	   (Dec.	   17,	   2010),	   http://strasbourg	  observers.com/2010/12/17/a-­‐b-­‐and-­‐c-­‐v-­‐ireland-­‐abortion-­‐and-­‐the-­‐margin-­‐of-­‐appreciation	  (questioning	  the	  Court’s	  use	  of	  a	  broad	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  in	   light	  of	   its	  other	  holdings,	  particularly	  regarding	   the	  applicants’	  argument	  about	  changing	  views	  on	  abortion	  in	  Ireland).	  	   129.	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   App.	   No.	   25579/05,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   61	   (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en.	  
	   130.	   See	  id.	  at	  60-­‐68	  (assessing	  only	  the	  burdens	  placed	  on	  Irish	  women	  in	  traveling	   to	   another	   country	   to	   obtain	   an	   abortion	   without	   considering	   the	  consequences	   of	   Ireland’s	   laws	   that,	   in	   effect,	   entirely	   ban	   the	   procedure	  within	  Ireland).	  
	   131.	   See	   Calt,	   supra	   note	   87,	   at	   1198-­‐1200	   (intimating	   that	   the	   decision	  indicated	   the	   Court’s	   movement	   toward	   finding	   a	   fundamental	   right	   to	  abortion	  because	  the	  Court	  framed	  the	  issue	  as	  assessing	  a	  State’s	  protection	  of	  morals	   rather	   than	   a	   State’s	   protection	   of	   the	   right	   to	   life	   of	   the	   unborn,	  thereby	  allowing	  the	  Court	  to	  grant	  the	  State	  much	  less	  deference).	  
	   132.	   See	  id.	  at	  1227-­‐30	  (predicting,	  prior	  to	  the	  ruling	  in	  A,	  B	  &	  C,	  that	  if	  the	  Court	  were	   to	   find	   that	   the	   Convention	   protected	   a	   right	   to	   abortion	   under	  
	   	  
420	   AM.	  U.	  INT’L	  L.	  REV.	   [27:2	  found	  that	  the	  injunction	  was	  disproportionate	  to	  the	  State’s	  aim	  of	   protecting	   morals	   because	   its	   absolute	   restriction	   on	   all	  abortion	   services	   information	  was	   too	   broad.133	   The	   Court	   also	  found	   that	   the	   injunction	   posed	   a	   substantial	   risk	   to	   women’s	  health	  by	  causing	  delays	  in	  procuring	  abortions	  and	  restricting	  a	  woman’s	   ability	   to	   obtain	   a	   safe	   and	   legal	   abortion	   and	  subsequent	  medical	  services.134	  	  Similar	   to	   the	   ban	   on	   information	   at	   issue	   in	  Open	   Door,	   the	  Irish	  laws	  at	  issue	  in	  A,	  B	  &	  C	  restricted	  access	  to	  abortion	  within	  the	  country	   that	  posed	  risks	   to	  women’s	  health.	  Therefore,	   it	   is	  reasonable	   to	   infer	   that	   a	   similar	   concern	   for	   women’s	   health	  would	   have	   extended	   to	   A,	   B	   &	   C	   where	   a	   woman’s	   access	   to	  abortion	  was	  once	  again	  at	  stake.135	  However,	  the	  Court	  in	  A,	  B	  &	  
C	   did	  not	   follow	  Open	  Door	   and	   instead	   granted	   Ireland	   a	  wide	  margin	   of	   appreciation	   without	   acknowledging	   the	   reality	   of	  women’s	  experiences	  in	  obtaining	  access	  to	  safe	  abortions.136	  For	  example,	  in	  A,	  B	  &	  C,	  A	  had	  to	  borrow	  money	  from	  a	  moneylender	  at	  a	  high	  interest	  rate	  and	  B	  had	  to	  borrow	  a	  friend’s	  credit	  card	  to	   book	   her	   flights	   in	   order	   to	   leave	   Ireland	   to	   procure	   an	  abortion.137	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  financial	  burdens	  upon	  both	  A	  and	  B,	   the	  applicants	   faced	  the	  social	  stigma	  attached	  to	  abortion	   in	  Ireland	   because	   of	   the	   restrictive	   laws	   as	   well	   as	   the	   physical	  ramifications	  of	  delaying	   their	  abortions	  because	  of	   the	  need	  to	  
 Article	   8,	   it	   would	   follow	   Open	   Door	   by	   characterizing	   the	   State’s	   aim	   as	   a	  protection	  of	  morals	   and	   likely	   find	   that	   such	  an	  aim	  does	  not	  outweigh	   the	  negative	  effects	  of	  Ireland’s	  abortion	  ban).	  	   133.	   Open	  Door	  v.	  Ireland,	  246	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  A)	  at	  29-­‐32	  (1992).	  
	   134.	   Id.	   at	   31,	   32	   (declining,	   however,	   to	   examine	   whether	   an	   Article	   8	  violation	  had	  occurred).	  
	   135.	   See	   Zampas	  &	  Gher,	   supra	  note	  123,	  at	  279	   (suggesting,	  based	  on	   the	  Court’s	   case	   law,	   that	   advocates	   challenging	   States’	   abortion	   restrictions	  should	   focus	   on	   the	   laws’	   effects	   on	   women’s	   health,	   because	   even	   when	  parties	  have	  not	  done	  so	  in	  the	  past,	  the	  Court	  has	  taken	  such	  a	  perspective).	  
	   136.	   But	  see	  Angela	  Thompson,	   International	  Protection	  of	  Women’s	  Rights:	  
An	  Analysis	  of	  Open	  Door	  Counselling	  Ltd.	  and	  Dublin	  Well	  Woman	  Centre	  v.	  Ireland,	  12	  B.U.	   INT’L	  L.J.	   371,	  391-­‐92	   (1994)	   (finding	   that	   the	  Court	   in	  Open	  
Door	   similarly	   did	   not	   consider	   women’s	   experiences	   when	   making	   its	  decision	  based	  upon	  an	  Article	  10	  violation).	  	   137.	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   App.	   No.	   25579/05,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   4	   (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4&portal	  =hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en.	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  travel.138	  The	   Court	   in	   A,	   B	   &	   C	   failed	   to	   adequately	   assess	   the	  proportionality	  of	  the	  sweeping	  restriction	  as	  it	  did	  in	  Open	  Door.	  In	   A,	   B	   &	   C,	   the	   Court	   focused	   on	   women’s	   “right”	   to	   travel	  outside	   the	   country,	   but	   did	   not	   fully	   acknowledge	   that	   the	  ability	   to	   travel	   is	   not	   a	   practical	   reality	   for	  many	  women	  who	  are	  impoverished,	  living	  in	  rural	  areas,	  or	  who	  are	  not	  citizens	  of	  the	   European	   Union	   and	   thus	   cannot	   easily	   enter	   another	  European	  State	  to	  obtain	  an	  abortion.139	  For	  Irish	  women	  unable	  to	   travel,	   Irish	  abortion	   laws	   fail	   to	  respect	   their	  right	   to	  health	  and	   well-­‐being	   because	   they	   effectively	   create	   an	   absolute	  injunction	   against	   abortion.140	   As	   Ruth	   Fletcher	   states	   in	   her	  response	   to	   the	   Court’s	   decision,	   “[A]llowing	   women	   to	   travel	  abroad	  [to	  procure	  an	  abortion]	  is	  stopping	  one	  step	  short	  of	  an	  absolutist	   authoritarian	   enforcement	   of	   protection	   of	   foetal	  life.”141	  Further,	  the	  Court	  failed	  to	  sufficiently	  consider	  the	  significant	  risks	   to	   women’s	   physical	   and	   mental	   health	   created	   even	   for	  those	   women	   who	   are	   able	   to	   travel	   outside	   Ireland.	   In	   Open	  
 
	   138.	   Cf.	   LIKE	   A	   SHIP	   IN	   THE	   NIGHT	   (Tall	   Girl	   Shorts	   2006)	   (documenting	   the	  stories	   of	   a	   young	   Irish	   painter,	   a	   working	   class	   Irish	   mother,	   and	   a	   self-­‐proclaimed	  Irish	  country	  girl	  as	  they	  cope	  with	  the	  shame,	  silence,	  and	  stigma	  that	  surrounded	  their	  journeys	  to	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  to	  procure	  abortions).	  
	   139.	   See	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   App.	   No.	   25579/05,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   67	   (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4&portal	  =hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en	   (acknowledging	   only	   briefly	   the	   “serious	   [psychological	   and	   physical]	  impact”	  both	  of	  these	  restrictions	  and	  the	  process	  of	  traveling	  for	  an	  abortion	  for	   A	   and	   B);	   see	   also	   HUMAN	   RIGHTS	  WATCH,	   A	   STATE	   OF	   ISOLATION:	   ACCESS	   TO	  ABORTION	   FOR	   WOMEN	   IN	   IRELAND	   16-­‐40	   (2010)	   (highlighting	   barriers	   to	  traveling	   to	   obtain	   an	   abortion,	   including	   financial	   constraints,	   immigration	  status,	  the	  social	  stigma	  of	  abortion	  and	  its	  associated	  psychological	  burdens,	  and	   the	   lack	   of	   accessible	   and	   accurate	   information	   about	   procuring	   an	  abortion).	  
	   140.	   See	  Mary	  Gilmartin,	  Abortion	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Mobility:	  Gilmartin	  on	  A,	  
B	   and	   C,	   HUMAN	   RIGHTS	   IN	   IR.	   (Dec.	   23,	   2010),	   http://www.humanrights.ie/	  index.php/2010/12/23/abortion-­‐and-­‐the-­‐politics-­‐of-­‐mobility-­‐gilmartin-­‐on-­‐a-­‐b-­‐and-­‐c	  (emphasizing	  that	  non-­‐European	  Union	  citizens	  living	  in	  Ireland	  may	  be	   denied	   a	   visa	   when	   attempting	   to	   re-­‐enter	   the	   country	   after	   leaving	   to	  procure	   an	   abortion,	   thus	  proving	   that	   travel	   is	   not	   a	   realistic	   option	   for	   all	  women).	  	   141.	   Fletcher,	  supra	  note	  5.	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Door,	   the	   Court	   accounted	   for	   the	   health	   risks	   the	   injunction	  created	   for	   Irish	   women	   by	   recognizing	   that	   the	   difficulty	   in	  obtaining	   information	   on	   procuring	   safe	   abortions	   may	   cause	  harmful	   delays	   in	   abortions	   necessary	   to	   protect	   women’s	  health.142	   The	   Court	   additionally	   noted	   how	   the	   injunction	  adversely	   affected	   women	   who	   did	   not	   have	   the	   proper	  resources	   or	   education	   to	   find	   the	   necessary	   information	   in	  alternative	   locations.143	  However,	   the	  Court	   in	  A,	  B	  &	  C	   failed	   to	  take	   into	   account	   such	   risks,	   instead	   focusing	   on	   Ireland’s	  protection	  of	  the	  “profound	  moral	  views	  of	  the	  Irish	  people	  as	  to	  the	   nature	   of	   life	  .	  .	  .	  .”144	   In	   Open	   Door,	   the	   Court	   considered	  public	  morals	   on	   the	  nature	  of	   life,	   but	   found	   that	   they	  did	  not	  outweigh	  the	  dangers	  of	  a	  blanket	  ban	  on	  access	  to	  information,	  a	   ban	   that	   does	   not	   immediately	   or	   certainly	   place	   women’s	  health	   at	   risk.145	   It	   should	   follow	   that	   the	   same	   public	   morals	  regarding	   the	   nature	   of	   life	   in	  A,	   B	   &	   C	   also	   fail	   to	   outweigh	   a	  blanket	   ban	   on	   access	   to	   abortion.	   The	   ban	   in	  A,	   B	   &	   C	   has	   an	  arguably	   larger	   impact	   on	   women’s	   health	   than	   did	   the	  injunction	   in	  Open	  Door	   because	   it	   is	   certain	   to	   affect	  women’s	  health	   and	   well-­‐being	   due	   to	   the	   inevitable	   delay	   in	   procuring	  abortions	   and	   the	   burdens	   of	   being	   forced	   to	   travel.146	   If	   the	  Court	   had	   more	   carefully	   scrutinized	   the	   nature	   of	   Ireland’s	  “right	   to	   travel”	   and	   its	   effect	   on	   women	   as	   it	   did	   with	   the	  injunction	   in	   Open	   Door,	   it	   would	   have	   found	   that	   Irish	   law	  
 	   142.	   Open	  Door	  v.	  Ireland,	  246	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  A)	  at	  31	  (1992).	  
	   143.	   Id.	  	   144.	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   App.	   No.	   25579/05,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   68	   (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en.	  
	   145.	   See	   Open	   Door	   v.	   Ireland,	   246	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   (ser.	   A)	   at	   29-­‐32	   (1992)	  (holding	   that	   limitations	   on	   information	   regarding	   activities	   permitted	   by	  State	  authorities,	   and	  which	   in	   this	   case	  may	  be	  crucial	   to	  a	  woman’s	  health	  and	   well-­‐being,	   require	   careful	   scrutiny	   to	   ensure	   that	   they	   conform	   to	   a	  democratic	  society).	  
	   146.	   See	  Video,	  Hearing	  –	  A,	  B	  &	  C	  v.	  Ireland	  in	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  
Rights,	   EUR.	   CT.	   HUM.	   RTS.	   (Dec.	   9,	   2009),	   http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/	  EN/Header/Press/Multimedia/	  Webcasts+of+public+hearings/webcastEN_media?&p_url=20091209-­‐1/en/	  (arguing	   that	   the	   resulting	   risk	   to	   health	   and	   well-­‐being	   from	   a	   ban	   on	  abortion	   is	   much	   greater	   than	   the	   resulting	   risk	   from	   lack	   of	   access	   to	  information,	   and	   this	   risk	   should	   therefore	   create	   a	   limited	   margin	   of	  appreciation	  for	  the	  State	  to	  restrict	  abortion	  when	  protecting	  public	  morals).	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  violates	  the	  Article	  8	  requirement	  to	  respect	  women’s	  health	  and	  well-­‐being.147	   Rather	   than	   following	   Open	   Door’s	  acknowledgement	  that	  any	  delay	  in	  procuring	  an	  abortion	  was	  a	  result	  of	   the	   injunction’s	  restrictions,	   the	  Court	   in	  A,	  B	  &	  C	  held	  that	  any	  delay	  or	  consequent	  physical	  and	  psychological	   impact	  was	  caused	  by	  factors	  beyond	  the	  law.148	  	  The	  Court	  failed	  to	  follow	  Open	  Door	  and	  improperly	  held	  that	  the	   sweeping	   restriction	   on	   abortion	   in	   Ireland	   was	  proportionate	   to	   the	  aim	  of	  protecting	  public	  morals	  because	   it	  did	  not	  account	  for	  the	  many	  ways	  the	  law	  significantly	  impacts	  women’s	  health	  and	  well-­‐being.	  In	  departing	  from	  Open	  Door	  and	  giving	  insufficient	  weight	  to	  a	  woman’s	  right	  to	  health	  and	  well-­‐being,	   the	  Court	  broadened	  States’	   ability	   to	   regulate	   this	   right,	  consequently	  limiting	  women’s	  Article	  8	  privacy	  rights.	  While	  the	  decision	   in	   A,	   B	   &	   C	   failed	   to	   account	   for	   the	   Open	   Door	  proportionality	   analysis	   on	   the	   breadth	   and	   nature	   of	   the	  restriction,	   it	   followed	  Open	   Door	   by	   applying	   a	   similarly	   wide	  margin	  of	   appreciation	   to	   regulate	  public	  morals.149	  As	   a	   result,	  the	   Court	   now	   has	   justification	   to	   defer	   to	   and	   uphold	   States’	  domestic	  laws	  restricting	  women’s	  ability	  to	  procure	  an	  abortion	  even	  when	   such	   laws	   clearly	   infringe	   upon	   a	  woman’s	   physical	  and	  mental	  health.150	  	  
2.	   A,	  B	  &	  C	  Failed	  to	  Take	  Account	  of	  the	  Court’s	  Other	  Privacy	  
Decisions	  That	  Limit	  a	  State’s	  Margin	  of	  Appreciation	  to	  Regulate	  
 
	   147.	   See	  A	  v.	  Ireland,	  App.	  No.	  25579/05,	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  80-­‐81	  (2010)	  (López	  Guerra,	  J.,	  concurring),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.	  int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en	   (expressing	   concern	   at	   the	   Court’s	  failure	  to	  assess	  the	  gravity	  of	  the	  dangers	  to	  the	  applicants’	  health	  and	  well-­‐being	  created	  by	  the	  Irish	  abortion	  ban).	  
	   148.	   See	   id.	   at	   37	   (suggesting	   that	   the	   delay	   and	   subsequent	   negative	  impacts	   were	   at	   least	   partially	   the	   result	   of	   A’s	   financial	   situation	   and	   B’s	  choice	  to	  consult	  an	  Irish	  counseling	  center	  prior	  to	  traveling	  abroad).	  
	   149.	   Cf.	   Thompson,	   supra	   note	  136,	   at	  401	   (criticizing	   the	  Court’s	  use	  of	   a	  wide	  margin	  of	  appreciation	   in	   light	  of	   its	  application	  of	  a	  narrow	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  to	  other	  private	  rights	  such	  as	  homosexual	  acts).	  
	   150.	   Cf.	   id.	  at	  401-­‐02	  (suggesting	   that	  Open	  Door’s	  use	  of	  a	  wide	  margin	  of	  appreciation	   indicated	   the	   Court’s	   willingness	   to	   allow	   States	   to	   regulate	  reproductive	   choice	   by	   characterizing	   it	   as	   a	   public	   morality	   rather	   than	  privacy	  issue).	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Privacy	  Rights	  In	  addition	  to	   failing	  to	  account	   for	   its	  decision	   in	  Open	  Door,	  the	  Court	  in	  A,	  B	  &	  C	  also	  departed	  from	  case	  law	  involving	  State	  infringement	   on	   other	   aspects	   of	   the	   right	   to	   privacy.151	   In	  
Dudgeon	   v.	   United	   Kingdom,	   the	   Court	   held	   that	   Northern	  Ireland’s	   law	   prohibiting	   all	   homosexual	   activity	   required	   a	  narrower	  margin	  of	  appreciation,	  even	  when	  enacted	  to	  protect	  public	   morals,	   because	   sexual	   activity	   is	   an	   intimate	   aspect	   of	  one’s	  existence.152	  Therefore,	  the	  law’s	  blanket	  ban	  and	  its	  effects	  on	   the	   physical	   and	   mental	   health	   of	   the	   individual	   made	   it	  disproportionate	  to	  protecting	  public	  morals	  and	  not	  “necessary	  to	   a	   democratic	   society.”153	   The	   Court	   emphasized	   that	   even	   if	  protecting	   morals,	   the	   absolute	   proscription	   of	   an	   essentially	  private	  activity	  would	  require	  a	  particularly	  pressing	  social	  need	  
 
	   151.	   See	   Klashtorny,	   supra	   note	   95,	   at	   439	   (explaining	   that	   the	   Court	  traditionally	  grants	  a	  narrow	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  when	  a	  matter	  involves	  a	  private	   rather	   than	   a	   public	   activity).	   While	   this	   section	   of	   the	   Comment	  primarily	   focuses	   on	  Dudgeon	   because	   of	   its	   analysis	   of	   interests	   similar	   to	  those	  in	  A	  v.	  Ireland,	  other	  cases	  may	  present	  an	  opportunity	  for	  comparison,	  particularly	  those	  involving	  the	  right	  to	  have	  children.	  For	  example,	  in	  Dickson	  
v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  the	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  State’s	  requirement	  that	  prisoners	  requesting	   access	   to	   artificial	   insemination	   facilities	   demonstrate	  “exceptional”	   circumstances	   was	   such	   a	   high	   burden	   that	   it	   effectively	  prevented	   any	   real	   balancing	   of	   individual	   and	   State	   interests	   in	   any	   given	  case,	   and	  was	   thus	   a	   violation	  of	  Article	  8.	  Dickson	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  App.	  No.	   44362/04,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.,	   ¶¶	   72-­‐85	   (2007),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item	  =1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=44362/04&sessionid=79959145&skin=hudoc-­‐en.	  Although	  Dickson	  may	  not	  be	  directly	  applicable	  because	   the	  State’s	   interest	  was	   not	   to	   protect	   public	  morals,	   it	   is	  worth	   noting	   that	   the	  Court’s	  assessment	  of	  the	  right	  to	  decide	  whether	  to	  have	  a	  child	  considered	  the	   law’s	   failure	   to	   account	   for	   individual	   circumstances.	   Ireland’s	   broad	  prohibition	   on	   abortion	   similarly	   fails	   to	   do	   so	   by	   broadly	   restricting	   all	  women	  from	  procuring	  an	  abortion	  in	  the	  country	  unless	  their	  lives	  are	  at	  risk	  regardless	   of	   individual	   circumstances.	  See	  A	  v.	   Ireland,	  App.	  No.	   25579/05,	  Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   80-­‐81	   (Lopez	   Guerra,	   J.,	   concurring)	   (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item	  =4&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en	  (chastising	   the	  Court	   for	   failing	   to	  account	   for	   the	  gravity	  of	   the	  dangers	  to	  the	  applicants’	  health	  or	  well-­‐being).	  	   152.	   Dudgeon	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  45	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  A)	  at	  21,	  24	  (1981).	  
	   153.	   See	   id.	  at	  18-­‐19,	  24	  (maintaining	   that	  even	  though	  the	   law	  was	  rarely	  enforced,	   its	   mere	   existence	   created	   psychological	   distress	   that	   interfered	  with	  the	  applicant’s	  private	  life).	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  and	  particularly	  serious	  reasons	  for	  State	  interference.154	  Because	   both	   Dudgeon	   and	   A,	   B	   &	   C	   weighed	   a	   State’s	  restriction	  based	  upon	  the	  protection	  of	  public	  morals	  against	  a	  privacy	  right,	  A,	  B	  &	  C	   should	  have	   followed	  Dudgeon	   in	   finding	  that	   the	  aim	  of	  public	  morals	  cannot	   justify	  blanket	  restrictions	  affecting	   individual	   health.	   Although	   Dudgeon	   failed	   to	   define	  what	  would	  be	  considered	  an	  intimate	  aspect	  of	  one’s	  existence	  beyond	   sexual	   activity,	   the	   broad	   range	   of	   activities	   protected	  under	   the	   right	   to	   privacy	   are	   often	   deemed	   sufficiently	  important	   to	   deserve	   a	   narrow	   margin	   of	   appreciation.155	  Because	   the	   Court	   in	   A,	   B	   &	   C	   held	   that	   Irish	   abortion	   laws	  infringed	   upon	   a	   fundamental	   privacy	   right	   —	   the	   applicants’	  physical	   and	   psychological	   integrity	   —	   the	   Court	   should	   have	  assessed	   Ireland’s	  margin	   of	   appreciation	   to	   infringe	   upon	   this	  right	  in	  the	  same	  way	  the	  Court	  did	  in	  Dudgeon.156	  	  Because	   the	   Court	   in	   Dudgeon	   refused	   to	   uphold	   a	   law	   that	  affected	  individuals’	  health	  and	  well-­‐being,	  the	  Court	  in	  A,	  B	  &	  C	  should	  have	  similarly	  refused	   to	  uphold	   Ireland’s	  abortion	   laws	  because	   they	  detrimentally	   affect	  women’s	  physical	   and	  mental	  health.	   The	   Court	   found	   in	  Dudgeon	   that	   the	   importance	   of	   the	  right	   to	   privacy,	   the	   fear	   of	   prosecution,	   and	   the	   psychological	  
 
	   154.	   Id.	  at	  21,	  24.	  
	   155.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Goodwin	   v.	   United	   Kingdom,	   2002-­‐VI	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   1,	   27	  (finding	   that	   conflicts	   between	   a	   post-­‐operative	   transsexual’s	   personal	   and	  legal	  gender	  identities	  create	  a	  serious	  interference	  with	  private	  life);	  Dickson	  v.	   United	   Kingdom,	   App.	   No.	   44362/04,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.,	   ¶	   78	   (2007),	  http://cmiskp.echr.	  coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=44362/04&sessionid=79959145&skin=hudoc-­‐en	   	   (noting	   that	   important	  aspects	  of	  an	  individual’s	  life	  under	  Article	  8,	  such	  as	  choosing	  to	  become	  a	  biological	  parent,	  generally	  entail	  a	  narrow	  margin	  of	  appreciation).	  
	   156.	   See	   Thompson,	   supra	   note	   136,	   at	   399	   (arguing	   that	   the	   Court	  inconsistently	  applies	   the	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  by	  varying	   its	  emphasis	  on	  the	  State	  interest	  in	  protecting	  morality);	  cf.	  A	  v.	  Ireland,	  App.	  No.	  25579/05,	  Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   80	   (Lopez	   Guerra,	   J.,	   concurring)	   (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.	  asp?item=4&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en	   (taking	   the	   position	   that	   because	   important	   aspects	   of	  individual	   existence	   normally	   require	   a	   narrow	  margin	   of	   appreciation,	   the	  Court	   should	   decide	   on	   a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   basis	   whether	   a	   woman	   seeking	   an	  abortion	  for	  reasons	  of	  health	  and	  well-­‐being	  was	  improperly	  prohibited	  from	  doing	  so).	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  pressures	  the	  anti-­‐sodomy	  law	  created	  were	  substantial	  enough	  to	   outweigh	   Northern	   Ireland’s	   interest	   in	   protecting	   morals,	  even	   if	   those	   morals	   were	   well-­‐embedded	   in	   Northern	   Irish	  society.157	  Ireland’s	  criminalization	  of	  abortion	  creates	  the	  fear	  of	  prosecution	   that	   existed	   in	   Dudgeon,	   but	   goes	   further	   by	  endangering	  women’s	  physical	  health	  if	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  leave	  the	   country	   to	  procure	   an	   abortion	  necessary	   to	  preserve	   their	  physical	   health	   or	   well-­‐being.158	   Further,	   Irish	   abortion	   law	  creates	   an	   added	   psychological	   burden	   because	   it	   perpetuates	  the	  social	  stigma	  surrounding	  abortion	  in	  Ireland.159	  	  If	   the	   Court	   in	   A,	   B	   &	   C	   had	   framed	   the	   issue	   as	   it	   did	   in	  
Dudgeon	   and	   looked	   at	   Ireland’s	   sweeping	   infringement	   on	   an	  intimate	   area	   of	   one’s	   private	   life	   to	   find	   that	   the	   law	   was	  disproportionate	  and	  not	  “necessary	  to	  a	  democratic	  society,”	   it	  would	   have	   had	   to	   narrow	   Ireland’s	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   in	  order	  to	  stay	  consistent	  with	  its	  case	  law.160	  Instead,	  by	  failing	  to	  apply	   Dudgeon	   to	   Irish	   abortion	   laws	   in	   A,	   B	   &	   C,	   the	   Court	  created	  a	  precedent	   that	  does	   exactly	  what	  Dudgeon	   attempted	  to	  prevent	  by	  granting	  States	  an	  essentially	  unchecked	  ability	  to	  enact	  blanket	  restrictions	  on	  a	  privacy	  right	  when	  the	  State’s	  aim	  is	  the	  protection	  of	  public	  morals.161	  
 	   157.	   Dudgeon	   v.	   United	   Kingdom,	   45	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   (ser.	   A)	   at	   18,	   23-­‐24	  (1981)	   (finding	   that	   the	   law’s	  mere	   existence,	   even	   though	   rarely	   enforced,	  was	   an	   infringement	   on	   the	   applicant’s	   right	   to	   be	   free	   from	   government	  intrusion	  into	  his	  sexual	  life).	  
	   158.	   See	  Cook,	  supra	  note	  122,	  at	  705	  (propounding	  the	  view	  that	  restrictive	  abortion	   laws	   can	   harness	   State	   power	   to	   require	   women	   to	   complete	  pregnancies	   and	   undertake	   all	   the	   responsibilities	   of	   parenthood	   “at	   the	  service	  of	  embryonic	  life”).	  
	   159.	   See	   IR.	   FAMILY	  PLANNING	  ASS’N,	   THE	   IRISH	   JOURNEY	  7	   (2000),	  available	   at	  http://safe.hyperlink.ie/files/documents/Irish%	  20Journey.pdf	  (warning	  that	  the	  taboo	  on	  reproductive	  rights	  contributes	  to	  a	  lack	   of	   adequate	   sexual	   education	   programs,	   difficulty	   accessing	   fertility	  clinics,	  and	  detrimental	  physical	  and	  mental	  effects	  from	  the	  associated	  shame	  in	  having	  an	  abortion,	  such	  as	  depression	  and	  the	  risk	  of	  suicide).	  
	   160.	   See	   JANIS,	   supra	   note	   68,	   at	   428	   (arguing	   that	  Dudgeon	   demonstrates	  that	  the	  Court	  strictly	  construes	  a	  State’s	  power	  to	  protect	  public	  morals	  and	  that	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  what	  acts,	  if	  any,	  may	  be	  regulated	  on	  this	  basis).	  
	   161.	   See	  Thompson,	  supra	  note	  136,	  at	  402-­‐03	  (criticizing	  the	  Court’s	  view	  of	   access	   to	   abortion	   as	   one	   of	   public	   morality	   rather	   than	   private	   life	   and	  arguing	  that	  this	  view	  allows	  the	  State	  to	  have	  a	  wide	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  to	   restrict	   a	   fundamental	   right);	   cf.	   Cook,	   supra	   note	   122,	   at	   654-­‐55	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  B.	   THE	  COURT	  IN	  A,	  B	  &	  C	  IMPROPERLY	  CONFLATED	  EUROPEAN	  CONSENSUS	  ON	  THE	  RIGHT	  TO	  LIFE	  OF	  A	  FETUS	  WITH	  EUROPEAN	  CONSENSUS	  ON	  A	  WOMAN’S	  RIGHT	  TO	  AN	  ABORTION	  WHEN	  HER	  HEALTH	  AND	  WELL-­‐BEING	  ARE	  AT	  RISK	  When	   determining	   the	  margin	   of	   appreciation	   a	   State	   has	   to	  regulate	   a	   fundamental	   right	   under	   the	   Convention,	   the	   Court	  often	   looks	   to	   European	   consensus	   on	   the	   existence	   of	   a	  particular	   right	   to	   determine	   whether	   a	   State	   should	   have	   a	  broad	  or	  narrow	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  to	  restrict	  that	  right.	  	  In	  
A,	  B	  &	  C,	  The	  Court	   improperly	  analyzed	  consensus	  on	  the	  right	  to	   life	   instead	   of	   considering	   consensus	   on	   a	   woman’s	   right	   to	  have	   an	   abortion	   when	   her	   health	   is	   at	   risk.162	   By	   focusing	   on	  European	   consensus	   on	   the	   right	   to	   life	   of	   the	   fetus,	   the	   Court	  avoided	   having	   to	   declare	   that	   a	   fundamental	   right	   to	   abortion	  exists,	   and	   also	   avoided	   holding	   Ireland	   in	   violation	   women’s	  right	  to	  health	  and	  well-­‐being	  under	  Article	  8	  of	  the	  Convention.	  	  The	  Convention	  was	  designed	  to	  establish	  fundamental	  rights	  among	  contracting	  States	  based	  upon	  an	  evolving	  notion	  of	  what	  constitutes	   a	   fundamental	   right.163	   Although	   the	   text	   of	   the	  enumerated	   articles	   themselves	   is	   not	   changed,	   the	   Court’s	  interpretation	  of	  what	  acts	  are	  protected	  under	  these	  rights	  can	  evolve	   as	   European	   consensus	   emerges.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   Court	  will	   generally	   only	   find	   that	   a	   particular	   individual	   activity	   is	  protected	   as	   a	   fundamental	   right	   if	   consensus	   exists	   on	  
 (denouncing	   States’	   disregard	   for	   protecting	   women’s	   reproductive	   health	  and	  instead	  oppressing	  women	  by	  placing	  their	  reproductive	  functions	  at	  the	  service	  of	  the	  State).	  
	   162.	   See	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   App.	   No.	   25579/05,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   65-­‐66	   (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4&portal	  =hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en	  (finding	  that	  because	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  fetus	  and	  woman	  are	  interconnected,	  the	  proper	  margin	  of	   appreciation	   inquiry	   is	   the	  balance	  of	   the	   rights	  of	   the	  fetus	  with	  those	  of	  the	  woman,	  which	  itself	  depends	  on	  the	  lack	  of	  European	  consensus	   on	  when	   life	   begins);	   cf.	   id.	   at	   87	   (Rozakis,	   J.,	   Tulkens,	   J.,	   Fura,	   J.,	  Hirvelä,	   J.,	  Malinverni,	   J.,	  and	  Poalelungi,	   J.,	  concurring	   in	  part	  and	  dissenting	  in	  part)	  (considering	  this	  ruling	  to	  be	  a	  rare	   instance	   in	  the	  Court’s	  case	   law	  when	   the	   Court	   does	   not	   narrow	   the	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   based	   upon	  consensus	  concerning	  an	  individual	  right).	  
	   163.	   See	   infra	   notes	   63-­‐65	   and	   accompanying	   text	   (explaining	   the	   Court’s	  use	   of	   European	   consensus	   to	   determine	   when	   an	   act	   has	   become	   a	  fundamental	  right	  under	  the	  Convention).	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  protecting	   the	   specific	   activity.164	   The	  Court	   does	   not,	   however,	  examine	   consensus	   on	   the	   State’s	   aim	   in	   restricting	   such	  behavior,	   such	  as	   for	   the	  protection	  of	   specific	  public	  morals.165	  Therefore,	   the	   Court	   would	   look	   at	   consensus	   to	   determine	  whether	  an	  individual’s	  action,	  or	  a	  State’s	  legislation	  to	  protect	  such	  action,	  was	  common	  practice,	  not	  to	  determine	  if	  the	  State’s	  aim	  in	  enacting	  legislation	  to	  restrict	  an	  activity	  was	  common.166	  For	  example,	  in	  Dudgeon,	  the	  Court	  analyzed	  consensus	  on	  State	  protection	   of	   privacy	   in	   sexual	   activity	   and	   the	   increased	  tolerance	  for	  homosexual	  activity;	   it	  did	  not	  examine	  consensus	  on	   public	   morals,	   Northern	   Ireland’s	   stated	   interest,	   because	  public	   morals	   are	   typically	   deemed	   to	   be	   determined	   by	   the	  individual	  State.167	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  significant	  that	  the	  Court	  in	  A,	  
 
	   164.	   See,	  e.g.,	  Dudgeon	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  45	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  A)	  at	  23-­‐24	  (1981)	  (noting	  that	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  era	  during	  which	  the	  United	  Kingdom’s	  law	  prohibiting	  homosexual	   activity	  was	   enacted,	   there	   is	  now	  an	   increased	  tolerance	  of	  homosexual	  behavior	  and	  a	  marked	  liberalization	  in	  the	  relevant	  domestic	   law	   of	   European	   States);	   see	   also	   Larry	   Catá	   Backer,	   Inscribing	  
Judicial	   Preference	   Into	  Our	   Fundamental	   Law:	  On	   the	  European	  Principles	   of	  
Margins	   of	   Appreciation	   as	   Constitutional	   Jurisprudence	   in	   the	  U.S.,	   7	   TULSA	   J.	  COMP.	  &	  INT’L	  L.	  327,	  352	  (2000)	  (quoting	  Paolo	  G.	  Carozza,	  Uses	  and	  Misuses	  of	  
Comparative	   Law	   in	   International	   Human	   Rights:	   Some	   Reflections	   on	   the	  
Jurisprudence	  of	   the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights,	   73	  NOTRE	  DAME	  L.	  REV.	  1217,	   1227	   (1998))	   (explaining	   that	   the	   use	   of	   consensus	   has	   helped	   the	  Court	  maintain	   its	   legitimacy	  when	  expanding	   the	  scope	  of	   the	  Convention’s	  protections).	  
	   165.	   See	  A	  v.	  Ireland,	  App.	  No.	  25579/05,	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  87	  (2010)	  (Rozakis,	  J.,	  Tulkens,	   J.,	   Fura,	   J.,	  Hirvelä,	   J.,	  Malinverni,	   J.,	   and	  Poalelungi,	   J.,	   concurring	   in	  part	   and	   dissenting	   in	   part),	   http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?	  item=4&portal	  =hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en	   (noting	   that	   even	   if	   the	  moral	   value	   of	   protecting	   fetal	   life	   still	   exists	   in	  Ireland,	   the	  Court	  has	  never	  before	  disregarded	  European	   consensus	  on	   the	  core	  issue	  of	  State	  interference	  with	  individual	  private	  life).	  
	   166.	   Cf.	  Laurence	  Helfer,	  Consensus,	  Coherence	  and	  the	  European	  Convention	  
on	   Human	   Rights,	   26	   CORNELL	   INT’L	   L.J.	   133,	   138	   (1993)	   (observing	   that	   the	  Court	   discerns	   whether	   common	   human	   rights	   protections	   have	   emerged	  among	   contracting	   States	   and	   that	   when	   a	   majority	   of	   States	   have	   either	  expanded	   a	   right	   guaranteed	   by	   the	   Convention	   or	   broadened	   the	   class	   of	  individuals	   to	  which	   it	   applies,	   the	  Court	   is	   likely	   to	   find	  consensus	  and	  will	  narrow	  a	  State’s	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  to	  regulate	  the	  activity).	  
	   167.	   See	  Ostrovsky,	  supra	  note	  32,	  52-­‐54	  (pointing	  out	  that	  while	  morals	  are	  viewed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  individual	  society,	  the	  idea	  that	  certain	  behavior	  is	   protected	   under	   the	   Convention	   is	   determined	   by	   evaluating	   consensus	  amongst	  States).	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B	  &	  C	  did	  not	  look	  at	  consensus	  on	  protecting	  the	  act	  that	  Ireland	  was	  restricting	  (abortion)	   to	  determine	  whether	   it	  had	  come	  to	  be	   considered	   a	   fundamental	   right	   under	   the	   Convention,	   but	  instead	   looked	   at	   Ireland’s	   interest	   in	   regulating	   the	   activity	  (protecting	  fetal	  life).168	  To	   determine	   whether	   consensus	   exists,	   the	   Court	   primarily	  uses	  a	  comparative	  analysis	  of	  European	  legislation	  to	  see	  if	  the	  majority	  of	  European	  States	  protect	  a	  specific	  activity	  in	  order	  to	  uphold	  a	  fundamental	  right	  enumerated	  in	  the	  Convention.169	  In	  
Goodwin	   v.	  United	  Kingdom,	   the	  Court	   looked	  beyond	  European	  consensus,	  assessing	  international	  law	  and	  domestic	  law	  in	  other	  countries,	   and	   found	   an	   established	   consensus	   on	   transsexuals’	  right	  to	  legally	  claim	  their	  post-­‐operative	  identity.170	  If	  the	  Court	  finds	  that	  European	  consensus	  exists	  regarding	  the	  protection	  of	  an	   activity	   or	   right,	   the	   Court	   will	   narrow	   a	   State’s	   margin	   of	  appreciation	   to	   regulate	   that	   activity	   or	   right,	   even	   when	   the	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  would	  normally	  be	  broad.171	  	  	  The	  consensus	  on	  allowing	  abortion	  when	  a	  woman’s	  health	  or	  well-­‐being	   is	   at	   risk	   is	   even	   stronger	   than	   in	  prior	   cases	  where	  the	   Court	   has	   used	   a	   consensus	   to	   narrow	   a	   State’s	   margin	   of	  appreciation.	  In	  A,	  B	  &	  C,	  the	  Court	  itself	  determined	  that	  such	  a	  consensus	  exists	  by	   finding	   that	  all	  but	   three	  Council	  of	  Europe	  
 
	   168.	   See	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   App.	   No.	   25579/05,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   65-­‐66	   (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4&portal	  =hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en	   (deciding	   that	   the	   relevant	   examination	   of	   consensus	   should	   be	   on	   the	  question	  of	  when	  life	  begins).	  
	   169.	   See	  Backer,	  supra	  note	  164,	  at	  352	  (quoting	  Carozza,	  supra	  note	  164,	  at	  1227)	  (explaining	  that	  this	  ensures	  the	  Court	  will	  neither	  act	  contrary	  to	  most	  States’	   interpretations	   of	   the	   Convention	   nor	   cause	   a	   State	   that	   does	   not	  conform	  with	   the	  majority	   to	   abandon	   the	   system	   believing	   the	   judiciary	   is	  overstepping	  its	  bounds).	  	   170.	   Goodwin	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  2002-­‐VI	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  1,	  29-­‐30	  (finding	  that	  an	   emerging	   European	   consensus	   and	   an	   international	   trend	   toward	   legal	  recognition	  of	  the	  gender	  identity	  of	  post-­‐operative	  transsexuals	  overrode	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  common	  European	  approach	  to	  resolving	  related	  legal	  technicalities);	  
see	  also	  Helfer,	  supra	  note	  166,	  at	  139	  (noting	  that	  to	  establish	  consensus,	  the	  Court	  generally	  relies	  on	  European	  domestic	  legislation,	  international	  treaties,	  regional	  legislation,	  expert	  consensus,	  and	  European	  public	  consensus).	  
	   171.	   See,	  e.g.,	  Dudgeon	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  45	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  A)	  at	  21,	  23-­‐24	  (1981)	  (applying	  this	  analysis	  to	  the	  criminalization	  of	  sodomy	  in	  Northern	  Ireland).	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  States	   have	   less	   restrictive	   laws	   than	   Ireland	   and	   that	   the	  majority	   of	   States	   allow	   abortion	   to	   protect	   a	   woman’s	   health	  and	   well-­‐being.172	   This	   consensus	   is	   stronger	   than	   that	   in	  
Goodwin	   because	   it	   is	   based	   on	   concrete	   evidence	   of	   European	  consensus	   rather	   than	  a	  mere	   international	   trend.	  The	  Court	   in	  
Goodwin	  did	  not	  base	  its	  determination	  of	  consensus	  on	  a	  review	  of	  European	  legislation,	  but	  instead	  focused	  on	  the	  international	  trend	   of	   legally	   recognizing	   transsexuals’	   identity,	   even	   if	   the	  specific	   laws	   varied	   in	   the	   forms	   of	   protection.173	   Similarly,	   in	  
Dudgeon,	   the	  Court	  found	  a	  European	  consensus	  on	  recognizing	  the	  existence	  of	  homosexual	  activity,	  but	  examined	  only	  the	  laws	  of	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   Wales,	   and	   Scotland.174	   Despite	   the	  limited	   geographic	   scope	   of	   the	   “consensus”	   found	   in	  Dudgeon,	  the	   Court	   still	   identified	   an	   increased	   tolerance	   toward	  recognizing	   homosexual	   activity.	   This	   demonstrates	   that	   the	  Court	  does	  not	  require	  a	  comparative	  analysis	  of	  all	  States’	  laws	  or	  all	  international	  bodies’	  decisions	  to	  determine	  that	  consensus	  exists.175	  However,	  the	  Court	  in	  A,	  B	  &	  C	  did	  review	  all	  Council	  of	  Europe	   States’	   legislation	   and	   recognized	   that	   the	   majority	   of	  States	   allowed	   abortion	   on	   broader	   grounds	   than	   those	   in	  Ireland.176	  Therefore,	  because	  the	  Court	  based	  previous	  findings	  
 
	   172.	   See	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   App.	   No.	   25579/05,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   32	   (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4&portal	  =hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en	   	   (observing	   that	   thirty	   out	   of	   the	   forty-­‐seven	   contracting	   States	   allow	  abortions	  on	  request,	  approximately	  forty	  allow	  abortions	  for	  health	  reasons,	  approximately	   thirty-­‐five	   for	  reasons	  of	  well-­‐being,	  and	  only	  Andorra,	  Malta,	  and	  San	  Marino	  have	  more	  restrictive	  abortion	  laws	  than	  Ireland).	  
	   173.	   See	  Goodwin	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  2002-­‐VI	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  1,	  29-­‐30.	  
	   174.	   See	  Dudgeon	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  45	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  A)	  at	  9-­‐10,	  23-­‐24	  (1981)	   (finding	   that	   England,	   Wales,	   and	   Scotland	   liberalized	   their	   laws	  prohibiting	  homosexual	  activity	   in	   the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	   to	  allow	  consenting	  males	   to	  engage	   in	  homosexual	  activity	  because	   the	  activities	  are	  within	   the	  realm	  of	  individual	  private	  life).	  
	   175.	   See	  id.	  at	  22,	  23-­‐24	  (holding	  that	  although	  the	  Northern	  Irish	  view	  that	  permitting	  homosexual	  activity	  would	  be	  damaging	  to	  the	  society’s	  morals	  is	  relevant,	   it	   cannot	   justify	   criminalizing	   consensual	   homosexual	   conduct	   in	  light	  of	  European	  consensus	  on	  the	  subject).	  
	   176.	   See	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   App.	   No.	   25579/05,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   65-­‐66	   (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4&portal	  =hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en	  (finding	  it	  unnecessary	  to	  look	  further	  to	  any	  international	  trend	  on	  access	  to	   abortion	   for	  health	  or	  well-­‐being	  because	   such	   consensus	  already	  existed	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  of	   consensus	  on	  weaker	  evidence	   than	  present	   in	  A,	  B	  &	  C,	   and	  has	  granted	  States	  a	  narrow	  margin	  of	   appreciation	   to	   regulate	  private	   rights	   based	   on	   such	   evidence,	   the	   Court	   in	   A,	   B	   &	   C	  should	  have	  similarly	  narrowed	  Ireland’s	  margin	  of	  appreciation.	  The	   Court’s	   failure	   to	   do	   so,	   however,	   indicates	   the	   Court’s	  unwillingness	  to	  protect	  women’s	  access	  to	  abortion.177	  Instead	   of	   using	   the	   existing	   consensus	   on	  women’s	   right	   to	  abortion	   to	   protect	   health	   and	   well-­‐being	   as	   a	   way	   to	   narrow	  Ireland’s	  margin	  of	  appreciation,	  the	  Court	  incorrectly	  found	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  consensus	  on	  when	  fetal	  life	  begins	  was	  the	  pertinent	  issue	   and	   allowed	   Ireland	   to	   maintain	   a	   broad	   margin	   of	  appreciation.178	   If	   in	   A,	   B	   &	   C	   the	   Court	   had	   been	   assessing	  women’s	   right	   to	   abortion	   under	   Article	   8	   against	   a	   State’s	  protection	  of	  a	  fetus	  under	  Article	  2’s	  right	  to	  life,	  an	  analysis	  of	  consensus	  on	  the	  right	  to	  life	  may	  have	  been	  applicable	  because	  the	  Court	  would	  be	  balancing	  two	  individual	  rights.179	  However,	  in	  A,	  B	  &	  C,	  the	  Court	  was	  not	  balancing	  two	  fundamental	  rights	  to	   decide	   which	   right	   carried	   greater	   weight,	   but	   was	   instead	  assessing	   a	   State’s	   ability	   to	   restrict	   a	   fundamental	   right,	   the	  right	   to	   privacy,	   in	   the	   name	   of	   protecting	   public	   morals.180	  
 among	  a	  substantial	  majority	  of	  the	  Convention’s	  contracting	  States).	  
	   177.	   Cf.	  Thompson,	  supra	  note	  136,	  at	  406	  (suggesting	  that	  the	  Court’s	  use	  of	  the	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  is	  discriminatory	  against	  women	  because	  it	  has	  used	   consensus	   to	   find	   a	   right	   to	  male	   sexual	   activity	   but	   fails	   to	   do	   so	   for	  rights	  that	  primarily	  affect	  women,	  such	  as	  reproductive	  rights).	  
	   178.	   See	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   App.	   No.	   25579/05,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   66	   (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4&portal	  =hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en	  (citing	  Vo	  v.	  France,	  2004-­‐VIII	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  67,	  107-­‐08)	  (leaving	  the	  issue	  of	  when	   life	   begins	   within	   the	   States’	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   because	   of	   the	  absence	   of	   European	   consensus	   on	   when	   life	   begins	   from	   either	   legal	   or	  scientific	  perspectives).	  
	   179.	   See	  Zampas	  &	  Gher,	  supra	  note	  123,	  at	  264-­‐66	  (detailing	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  Court	  has	  held	  that	  a	  fetus	  does	  not	  have	  an	  absolute	  right	  to	  life,	  but	  has	  repeatedly	   avoided	   deciding	   whether	   or	   not	   a	   fetus	   has	   more	   limited	  protection	  under	  Article	  2).	  
	   180.	   See	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   App.	   No.	   25579/05,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   68	   (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4&portal	  =hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en	  (“[T]he	  Court	  does	  not	  consider	  that	  the	  prohibition	  in	  Ireland	  of	  abortion	  for	  health	  and	  well-­‐being	  reasons,	  based	  as	  it	  is	  on	  the	  profound	  moral	  views	  of	   the	   Irish	   people	   .	   .	   .	   exceeds	   the	  margin	   of	   appreciation	   accorded	   in	   that	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  REV.	   [27:2	  Therefore,	   because	   A’s	   and	   B’s	   rights	   were	   the	   only	   individual	  rights	   at	   issue,	   their	   rights	   should	   have	   been	   the	   only	   rights	  considered	   when	   evaluating	   consensus	   in	   A,	   B	   &	   C.	   Any	  protection	  of	  fetal	  life	  is	  merely	  one	  aspect	  of	  the	  State’s	  interest	  in	   protecting	   public	  morals	   under	   Article	   8(2).	   As	   a	   result,	   the	  Court	  should	  have	  narrowed	  Ireland’s	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  to	  regulate	   based	   upon	   public	   morals	   because	   of	   the	   existing	  consensus	  on	  the	  right	  to	  abortion	  to	  protect	  women’s	  health	  and	  well-­‐being.181	  	  To	  reach	  its	  holding,	  the	  Court	  inappropriately	  relied	  on	  Vo	  v.	  
France,	  where	  the	  Court	  analyzed	  whether	  the	  fetus	  was	  entitled	  to	  a	  right	  to	  life	  under	  Article	  2	  when	  a	  woman	  sued	  her	  doctor	  for	  unintentional	  homicide	  after	  he	  mistakenly	  tried	  to	  remove	  a	  contraceptive	  coil	  and	  was	  later	  required	  to	  perform	  an	  abortion	  on	   her.182	   The	   Court	   in	   Vo	   granted	   France	   a	   wide	   margin	   of	  appreciation	   to	   determine	   whether	   a	   fetus	   is	   protected	   under	  France’s	   unintentional	   homicide	   laws	   because	   no	   European	  consensus	   existed	   on	   when	   life	   begins.183	   However,	   unlike	   the	  Court	  in	  Vo,	   the	  Court	  in	  A,	  B	  &	  C	  was	  not	  analyzing	  the	  right	  to	  life	  under	  Article	  2,	  but	  a	  woman’s	  right	  to	  health	  and	  well-­‐being	  under	  Article	  8,	  and	  the	  Court	  was	  balancing	  it	  against	  the	  State’s	  interest	   in	   regulating	   public	   morals.	   Therefore,	   the	   Court	  inappropriately	   relied	   on	   Vo	   and	   should	   have	   relied	   on	   cases	  balancing	   a	   State’s	   protection	   of	   public	   morals	   against	   an	  individual	  interest,	  such	  as	  Open	  Door,	  Dudgeon,	  and	  Goodwin.	  	  As	  the	  dissenting	  judges	  in	  A,	  B	  &	  C	  note,	  this	  is	  the	  first	  time	  
 respect	  to	  the	  Irish	  State.”).	  
	   181.	   Cf.	  Sandra	  Coliver,	  The	  Right	  to	  Necessary	  Information	  for	  Reproductive	  
Health	   and	   Choice	   Under	   International	   Law,	   44	   AM.	   U.	   L.	   REV.	   1279,	   1293	  (1995)	  (arguing	  that	  the	  tolerance	  of	  abortion	  among	  most	  Council	  of	  Europe	  States	  was	  a	  major	   factor	   in	  Open	  Door,	  where	  the	  Court	  ruled	  that	   Ireland’s	  morality-­‐based	   restriction	   on	   information	   violated	   Article	   10);	   Robert	  Wintemute,	  Consensus	  is	  the	  Right	  Approach	  for	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  
Rights,	   GUARDIAN.CO.UK	   (Aug.	   12,	   2010,	   8:00	   AM),	  http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2010/aug/12/European-­‐court-­‐human-­‐rights-­‐consensus	   (finding	   that	   “‘European	   consensus	   serves	   to	   anchor	   the	  [C]ourt	  in	  legal,	  political	  and	  social	  reality”	  and	  gives	  it	  legitimacy	  for	  issuing	  binding	  judgments).	  	   182.	   Vo	  v.	  France,	  2004-­‐VIII	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  67,	  75,	  93.	  
	   183.	   See	   id.	   at	   109-­‐10	   (holding	   that	   whether	   or	   not	   Article	   2	   applied,	   the	  plaintiff	  was	  afforded	  appropriate	  domestic	  civil	  remedies	  for	  her	  loss).	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  the	  Court	  has	  disregarded	  a	  European	  consensus	  concerning	  an	  individual	   fundamental	   right,	   instead	   grounding	   its	   holding	  solely	  on	  a	  State’s	  ability	  to	  regulate	  based	  on	  protecting	  public	  morals.184	  Had	  the	  Court	  not	  improperly	  conflated	  the	  consensus	  at	   issue,	   it	   would	   have	   had	   to	   acknowledge	   European	   and	  international	   consensuses	   on	   a	   woman’s	   right	   to	   abortion	   to	  protect	   her	   health	   and	  well-­‐being.185	   In	   failing	   to	   find	   that	   this	  consensus	  narrows	  the	  State’s	  margin	  of	  appreciation,	  the	  Court	  has	   departed	   from	   a	   long	   line	   of	   cases	   in	   which	   consensus	   is	  often	   the	   most	   important	   factor	   in	   the	   margin	   of	   appreciation	  analysis.186	  The	  Court’s	  holding	  minimizes	   the	  use	  of	   consensus	  as	   a	   way	   to	   narrow	   a	   State’s	   margin	   of	   appreciation,	   and	   it	  creates	  precedent	   that	  will	  allow	  the	  Court	   to	  continue	   to	  defer	  to	   States’	   restrictive	   abortion	   laws.	   This	   creates	   worrying	  jurisprudence	   for	   future	   cases	   on	   abortion	   because	   strong	  disagreements	  regarding	  when	  life	  begins	  means	  that	  consensus	  on	   the	   issue	   is	   unlikely.187	   Therefore,	   the	  Court	   can	   continue	   to	  hold	   that	  States	  with	   restrictive	  abortion	   laws	  are	  not	  violating	  women’s	  fundamental	  rights.	  
 
	   184.	   See	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   App.	   No.	   25579/05,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   87	   (Rozakis,	   J.,	  Tulkens,	   J.,	   Fura,	   J.,	  Hirvelä,	   J.,	  Malinverni,	   J.,	   and	  Poalelungi,	   J.,	   concurring	   in	  part	  and	  dissenting	   in	  part)	  (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.	  asp?item=4&portal	  =hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en	   (calling	   the	   decision	   a	   “real	   and	  dangerous	   new	  departure	   in	   the	   Court’s	  case	   law”	   because	   it	   indicates	   that	   an	   individual	   State’s	   moral	   views	   can	  override	  European	  consensus).	  
	   185.	   See	  Zampas	  &	  Gher,	  supra	  note	  123,	  at	  292-­‐94	  (perceiving	  a	  movement	  toward	  a	  fundamental	  right	  to	  abortion	  based	  on	  contemporary	  developments	  in	  all	  major	  continents).	  
	   186.	   See	   Helfer,	   supra	   note	   166,	   at	   139-­‐40	   (noting	   that	   the	   consensus	  analysis	  is	  one	  of	  the	  “primary	  tools”	  by	  which	  the	  Court	  achieves	  its	  purpose	  of	   protecting	   individual	   rights	   in	   light	   of	   “the	   common	   European	   heritage,”	  and	   citing	   many	   cases	   where	   the	   Court	   has	   defined	   consensus	   in	   different	  terms	   and	   sought	   evidence	   of	   it	   in	   various	   sources	   as	   part	   of	   its	  margin	   of	  appreciation	  analysis).	  
	   187.	   Cf.	  Cook,	  supra	  note	  122,	  at	  645-­‐50	  (discussing	  the	  historical	  tendency	  to	   view	  women’s	   reproductive	   health	   issues	   as	   a	   threat	   to	   the	  moral	   order,	  resulting	   in	   laws	   and	   policies	   that	   seek	   to	   restrict	   women’s	   access	   to	  reproductive	  health	  options).	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  IV.	  	  RECOMMENDATIONS	  If	  the	  Court	  follows	  its	  ruling	  in	  A,	  B	  &	  C,	  future	  cases	  on	  States’	  abortion	   laws	   before	   the	   Court	   may	   result	   in	   granting	   States	  essentially	   unchecked	   power	   to	   regulate	   women’s	   access	   to	  abortion	   as	   long	   as	   the	   State	   asserts	   that	   its	   aim	   is	   to	   protect	  public	   morals.	   Further,	   Irish	   women	   will	   continue	   to	   have	   to	  leave	   their	   country	   to	   obtain	   an	   abortion	   regardless	   of	   dire	  circumstances	  that	  threaten	  their	  health	  and	  well-­‐being.	  A.	   THE	  COURT	  SHOULD	  DEVELOP	  A	  CONSISTENT	  APPLICATION	  OF	  THE	  MARGIN	  OF	  APPRECIATION	  IN	  REGULATING	  RIGHTS	  UNDER	  THE	  CONVENTION	  The	   Court	   should	   develop	   a	   consistent	   application	   of	   the	  margin	   of	   appreciation	   by	   following	   its	   previous	   holdings	   on	  cases	   involving	   intimate	   areas	  of	  private	   life.	   In	  previous	   cases,	  the	  Court	  determined	  the	  appropriate	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  for	  examining	   whether	   the	   State’s	   aim	   was	   “necessary”	   only	   after	  assessing	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   regulation,	   the	   right	   involved,	   and	  whether	  European	  consensus	  existed.188	  In	  A,	  B	  &	  C,	  however,	  the	  Court	   failed	   to	  apply	   this	  analysis,	   thus	  creating	  an	   inconsistent	  application	  of	  the	  margin	  of	  appreciation.	  	  To	   ensure	   that	   women’s	   fundamental	   rights	   are	   protected	  under	  the	  Convention,	  the	  Court	  should	  apply	  the	  same	  depth	  of	  analysis	   it	   has	   in	   previous	   cases	   so	   that	  women’s	   reproductive	  rights	   receive	  as	  much	  consideration	  as	  other	   intimate	  areas	  of	  private	   life.	   Specifically,	   the	   Court	   should	   follow	   its	   analysis	   in	  cases	  such	  as	  Open	  Door,	  where	  it	  examined	  the	  true	  effect	  that	  a	  blanket	   ban	   restricting	   women’s	   access	   to	   abortion	   has	   on	   a	  woman,	  such	  as	  placing	  her	  physical	  and	  mental	  health	  at	  risk.189	  Further,	  the	  Court	  should	  follow	  the	  case	  law	  existing	  prior	  to	  A,	  
B	  &	  C	  and	  consider	  consensus	  on	  protecting	  the	  individual	  right	  
 
	   188.	   See	   Calt,	   supra	   note	   87,	   at	   1227	   (predicting	   that	   based	   on	   prior	   case	  law,	  the	  Court	  would	  require	  Ireland	  to	  justify	  its	  morality-­‐based	  restrictions	  on	   abortion	  with	   highly	   compelling	   reasons);	   see	  also	   discussion	   supra	   Part	  III.A	   (arguing	   that	   the	   Court	   failed	   to	   properly	   determine	   whether	   Irish	  abortion	   laws	   are	   “necessary	   to	   a	   democratic	   society”	   by	   failing	   to	   properly	  assess	  the	  law’s	  breadth	  and	  its	  effects	  on	  Irish	  women).	  
	   189.	   See	  discussion	  supra	  Part	  III.A.	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  instead	   of	   consensus	   on	   the	   State’s	   aim	   for	   restricting	   this	  right.190	  Thus,	   it	  should	  consider	  consensus	  on	  women’s	  right	  to	  abortion	   instead	   of	   assessing	   consensus	   on	  when	   life	   begins.191	  Because	  of	  the	  clearly	  existing	  consensus	  on	  the	  right	  to	  abortion	  to	   preserve	   women’s	   health,	   the	   Court	   should	   narrow	   States’	  margin	   of	   appreciation	   in	   future	   cases	   concerning	   female	  reproductive	   rights	   to	  ensure	  States	  have	   less	  ability	   to	   restrict	  women’s	  access	  to	  abortion.	  B.	   THE	  COURT	  SHOULD	  DECLARE	  THAT	  ARTICLE	  8	  PROTECTS	  A	  WOMAN’S	  ACCESS	  TO	  ABORTION	  WHEN	  HER	  HEALTH	  AND	  WELL-­‐BEING	  ARE	  AT	  RISK	  OR	  SHOULD	  ALTERNATIVELY	  APPLY	  A	  CASE-­‐BY-­‐CASE	  ANALYSIS	  	  Because	  of	   the	  Convention’s	  evolutive	  nature,	   the	  Court	   finds	  that	   certain	   activities	   become	   components	   of	   the	   normative	  rights	  enumerated	   in	   the	  Convention	  when	  consensus	  exists	  on	  the	   issue.192	  However,	   despite	   consensus	  on	  a	  woman’s	   right	   to	  abortion	  when	  her	  health	  and	  well-­‐being	  are	  at	  risk,193	  the	  Court	  has	  yet	  to	  recognize	  a	  fundamental	  right	  to	  procure	  an	  abortion	  under	   the	  Convention.	  By	   failing	   to	  declare	  a	   fundamental	   right	  to	   abortion	   in	   A,	   B	   &	   C,	   the	   Court	   has	   allowed	   States	   with	  restrictive	   abortion	   laws	   to	   continue	   to	   restrict	   women’s	  
 
	   190.	   See	   discussion	   supra	   Part	   III.B	   (explaining	   the	   Court’s	   prior	   use	   of	  consensus	  on	  protecting	  an	  individual	  right,	  in	  cases	  such	  as	  Goodwin	  v.	  United	  
Kingdom,	  and	  its	  departure	  from	  this	  doctrine	  in	  A	  v.	  Ireland).	  
	   191.	   See	  id.;	  see	  also	  Fletcher,	  supra	  note	  5	  (charging	  that	  the	  Court’s	  failure	  to	   determine	   that	   health	   and	   well-­‐being	   invoke	   a	   narrow	   margin	   of	  appreciation	  based	  upon	  a	   lack	  of	  consensus	  on	  when	  life	  begins	  was	  a	  poor	  piece	  of	   legal	  reasoning	  because	  the	  issues	  of	  health	  and	  fetal	   life	  need	  to	  be	  distinguished).	  
	   192.	   See,	  e.g.,	  Norris	   v.	   Ireland,	  App.	  No.	  10581/83,	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.,	  ¶¶	  46-­‐47	  (1988),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland%20%7C%2010581/83&sessionid=80732496&skin=hudoc-­‐en	  (upholding	  Dudgeon	  and	  ruling	  that	  based	  on	  European	  consensus	  on	  the	   right	   to	   engage	   in	   homosexual	   acts,	   Ireland’s	   prohibition	   on	   such	   acts	  violated	  Article	  8).	  
	   193.	   See	   CTR.	   FOR	   REPRODUCTIVE	   RIGHTS,	   supra	   note	   3,	   at	   2	   (demonstrating	  that	  most	   States	   have	   less	   restrictive	   abortion	   laws	   than	   Ireland,	   and	   those	  that	   completely	   ban	   abortions	   or,	   like	   Ireland,	   allow	   them	   only	   when	   a	  woman’s	  life	  is	  at	  risk,	  are	  primarily	  States	  in	  Africa,	  Asia,	  and	  Latin	  America).	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  reproductive	   rights.194	   To	   be	   consistent	   with	   case	   law	   that	  interprets	   fundamental	  rights	   in	   light	  of	  modern	  conditions,	   the	  Court	  should	   find	   that	  Article	  8	   includes	  a	   fundamental	   right	   to	  abortion	  when	  women’s	  health	  and	  well-­‐being	  are	  at	  risk.	  	  If	   the	   Court	   is	   not	   willing	   to	   declare	   a	   fundamental	   right	   to	  abortion,	   the	  Court	   should	   at	   least	   follow	   Judge	  Lopez	  Guerra’s	  suggestion	   in	   his	   concurring	   opinion	   and	   apply	   the	   margin	   of	  appreciation	   on	   a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   basis,	   taking	   into	   account	   the	  specific	  risks	  to	  each	  woman’s	  health	  when	  a	  State	  has	  restrictive	  abortion	   laws.195	   Although	   this	   change	   does	   not	   guarantee	   all	  women	  a	   fundamental	   right	   to	   abortion,	   it	  may	  present	   a	  more	  realistic	   solution	   that	   allows	   the	   Court	   to	   respect	   State	  sovereignty	   while	   ensuring	   the	   protection	   of	   women’s	  fundamental	  right	  to	  health	  and	  well-­‐being.	  	  	  C.	   THE	  INTERNATIONAL	  COMMUNITY	  SHOULD	  EXERT	  PRESSURE	  ON	  IRELAND	  TO	  LIBERALIZE	  ITS	  RESTRICTIVE	  ABORTION	  LAWS	  	  While	   the	   Court’s	   ruling	   in	  A,	   B	  &	   C	   affects	  women’s	   right	   to	  abortion	   across	   Council	   of	   Europe	   States,	   it	   specifically	   affects	  Irish	  women	  because	   Ireland	   is	  one	  of	   the	   few	  States	  with	  such	  
 
	   194.	   Cf.	  Cook,	  supra	  note	  122,	  at	  726-­‐27	  (arguing	  that	   international	  bodies	  should	   hold	   states	   responsible	   for	   securing	   women’s	   reproductive	   rights	  because	   such	   rights	   involve	   the	   fundamental	   human	   rights	   principles	   of	  dignity	  and	  equality).	  
	   195.	   See	  A	  v.	  Ireland,	  App.	  No.	  25579/05,	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  80	  (Lopez	  Guerra,	  J.,	  concurring)	  (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int	  /tkp197/view.asp?item=4&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en	   (suggesting	   that	   the	   Court	   examine	   the	  degree	  and	  gravity	  of	   the	   risk	   to	   the	  woman’s	  health	  and	  well-­‐being	   in	  each	  individual	   case,	   noting	  his	   opinion	   that	   the	   risks	   faced	  by	  A	   and	  B	  were	  not	  severe	   enough	   to	   hold	   Ireland	   in	   violation	   of	  Article	   8).	  Compare	   Dickson	   v.	  United	   Kingdom,	   App.	   No.	   44362/04,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.,	   ¶¶	   72-­‐85	   (2007),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal	  =hbkm&action=html&highlight=44362/04&sessionid=79959145&skin=hudoc-­‐en	   	   (finding	   an	   Article	   8	   violation	   where	   the	   State	   did	   not	   effectively	  consider	   individual	   requests	   from	   prisoners	   seeking	   access	   to	   artificial	  insemination	   facilities),	  with	   Pretty	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  2002-­‐III	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  155,	   197	   (upholding	   a	   blanket	   prohibition	   on	   assisted	   suicide	   against	   an	  Article	   8	   challenge	   because	   it	   accounted	   for	   individual	   circumstances	   by	  requiring	   official	   consent	   to	   bring	   a	   prosecution	   and	   allowing	   flexibility	   in	  imposing	  penalties).	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  restrictive	   abortion	   laws.196	   The	   Court’s	   holding	   in	   A,	   B	   &	   C	  regarding	  applicant	  C197	   has	   the	  potential	   to	   expand,	   or	   at	   least	  clarify,	   when	   women	   may	   legally	   procure	   abortions	   within	  Ireland.198	  However,	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  States	  and	  the	  greater	  international	   community	   should	   exert	   political	   pressure	   on	  Ireland	  to	  reconsider	   its	  restrictive	  abortion	   laws,	   through	  such	  means	  as	  reports	  from	  United	  Nations	  bodies	  expressing	  concern	  with	   Ireland’s	   restrictive	   laws	   or	   economic	   sanctions	   from	   the	  European	  Union.199	  	  In	   addition,	   based	   upon	   the	   changing	   views	   in	   Ireland	  concerning	   the	   right	   to	   abortion,	   the	   Irish	   government	   should	  consider	   passing	   a	   constitutional	   amendment	   or	   enacting	  legislation	  to	  allow	  abortion	  where	  there	  is	  substantial	  risk	  to	  a	  woman’s	   health	   and	   well-­‐being.200	   Political	   pressure	   and	  international	   critique	   of	   Ireland’s	   laws	   could	   push	   Ireland	   to	  
 
	   196.	   See	   A	   v.	   Ireland,	   App.	   No.	   25579/05,	   Eur.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   32	   (2010),	  http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4&portal	  =hbkm&action=html&highlight=ireland&sessionid=79960503&skin=hudoc-­‐en	   (naming	   Andorra,	   Malta,	   and	   San	   Marino	   as	   the	   only	   Council	   of	   Europe	  States	  prohibiting	  abortion	  in	  all	  circumstances).	  
	   197.	   See	  id.	  at	  75	  (holding	  that	  Ireland	  violated	  C’s	  right	  to	  privacy	  by	  failing	  to	   enact	   an	   effective	   procedure	   for	   women	   to	   establish	   whether	   they	   are	  entitled	  to	  a	  lawful	  abortion	  because	  their	  lives	  are	  at	  risk).	  
	   198.	   Cf.	  Rory	  Fitzgerald,	  What	   the	  ECHR’s	  Ruling	  on	  Abortion	  Actually	  Says,	  NEWSWHIP	  (Dec.	  16,	  2010),	  http://newswhip.ie/	  national-­‐2/what-­‐the-­‐echrs-­‐ruling-­‐on-­‐abortion-­‐actually-­‐says	   (explaining	   that	  the	   ruling	   does	   not	   change	   any	   substantive	   law	   and	   observing	   that	   it	   is	  Ireland’s	  decision	  as	  to	  how,	  or	  whether,	  to	  implement	  the	  decision).	  
	   199.	   See,	  e.g.,	  U.N.	  Hum.	  Rts.	  Comm.,	  Consideration	  of	  Reports	   Submitted	  by	  
State	   Parties	   Under	   Article	   40	   of	   the	   Covenant,	   ¶	   13,	   U.N.	   Doc	  CCPR/C/IRL/CO/3	  (July	  30,	  2008)	  (“The	  State	  party	  .	  .	  .	  should	  take	  measures	  to	  help	  women	  avoid	  unwanted	  pregnancies	  so	  that	  they	  do	  not	  have	  to	  resort	  to	   illegal	   or	   unsafe	   abortions	   that	   could	   put	   their	   lives	   at	   risk	   .	   .	   .	   or	   to	  abortions	  abroad	  .	  .	  .	  .”);	  Bryan	  Mercurio,	  Abortion	  in	  Ireland:	  An	  Analysis	  of	  the	  
Legal	   Transformation	   Resulting	   From	  Membership	   in	   the	   European	  Union,	   11	  TUL.	   J.	   INT’L	  &	  COMP.	  L.	  141,	  179	  (2003)	  (noting	  that	   the	  economic	  benefits	  of	  EU	   membership,	   combined	   with	   international	   public	   opinion,	   have	   already	  forced	  Ireland	  to	  slowly	  liberalize	  its	  abortion	  laws).	  
	   200.	   See	  Máiréad	  Enright,	  A,	  B	  &	  C	  v.	  Ireland:	  Where	  to	  Now?,	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  IN	   IRELAND	   (Dec.	   17,	   2010),	  http://www.humanrights.ie/index.php/2010/12/17/a-­‐b-­‐c-­‐v-­‐ireland-­‐where-­‐to-­‐now	   (suggesting	   that	   Ireland	   could	   take	   the	   proactive	   steps	   of	   either	  holding	  a	  referendum	  to	  amend	  the	  abortion	  provisions	  in	  its	  constitution	  or	  implementing	  legislation	  to	  remedy	  the	  deficiencies	  identified	  by	  the	  Court).	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  its	  abortion	  regulations	  and	  better	  protect	  women’s	  right	  to	  health	  and	  well-­‐being.201	  V.	   CONCLUSION	  The	  Court	   in	  A,	  B	  &	  C	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  declare	  that	   the	  fundamental	   right	   to	   privacy	   includes	   a	   woman’s	   right	   to	  abortion	  and	  that	  States	  may	  not	  restrict	  this	  right	  to	  the	  extent	  that	   it	   interferes	  with	  a	  woman’s	  right	  to	  health	  and	  well-­‐being.	  Although	  A,	  B	  &	  C	  was	  touted	  as	  potentially	  being	  “Europe’s	  Roe	  v.	   Wade,”	   the	   Court	   ultimately	   produced	   disappointing	   results.	  The	  Court	  chose	  to	  ignore	  its	  prior	  case	  law	  and	  defer	  to	  Ireland’s	  domestic	   laws	   despite	   the	   substantial	   infringement	   on	   a	  woman’s	  right	  to	  health	  and	  well-­‐being.	  The	  Court	  also	  ignored	  a	  clear	  European	  consensus	  on	  a	  woman’s	  right	  to	  abortion	  when	  her	  health	  and	  well-­‐being	  are	  at	  risk.	   In	  doing	  so,	   the	  Court	  has	  left	   the	   door	   open	   for	   States	   to	   restrict	   women’s	   access	   to	  abortion	  as	   long	  as	   they	  do	  so	   in	   the	  name	  of	  protecting	  public	  morals.	  	  
 
 
	   201.	   See	  id.	  (considering	  the	  political	  ramifications	  Ireland	  would	  likely	  face	  if	   it	   ignored	   the	   Court’s	   ruling	   regarding	   C,	   ultimately	   putting	   Ireland’s	  membership	  in	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  in	  jeopardy).	  
